This is an opinion piece by Jiten Yumnam, Secretary of the Centre for Research and Advocacy – Manipur.
The climate crisis has become an emergency across the South Asia region, affecting not just the environment, but also inter-community relations within countries and border disputes among South Asian countries.
Glaciers are fast melting in the Himalayas[1]. Climate-induced disasters have been regular and intense, with recurrent floods, glacial lake outburst flow (GLOF), and hailstorms, among others. For instance, the massive flood that hounded Pakistan in 2022 claimed more than 1,700 lives and affected some 33 million people[2]. Meanwhile, the climate change-induced glacial lake outburst washed away the USD 1.4 billion 1200 MW Teesta III Hydroelectric Project in the Himalayan portion of Sikkim, North East India in October 2023.
The increased water stress and resource depletion due to climate change have also led to the pursuance of false climate solutions by Governments in the region, exacerbating the climate crisis and existing tensions within South Asia. With multiple transboundary rivers crisscrossing the region, water sharing and water resources control have long been a cradle of conflict in South Asia.
In December 2024, China finalized plans for the construction of the world’s largest dam, with 60000 MW generation capacity[3], on the section of the Brahmaputra, closest to India[4]. The plans are part of China’s bid to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 to mitigate climate change[5]. With India’s relationship with China marred with boundary and territorial disputes, China’s mega dam approval has huge conflict potential with India. China continues to occupy the Aksai Chin portion of Jammu and Kashmir besides claiming Arunachal Pradesh, much to India’s opposition. The Indo-China War of 1962, the Doklam Standoff of 2017, the Galwan Valley Clash of 2020 and at Tawang Region in 2022, explain the conflict-oriented relationship between the two countries. India accused China of ‘weaponizing’ water and believes that China could cut off water or raise the water levels to flood India should a military conflict or war break out between them. Reports indicate that China indeed blocked the flow of the Galwan River from its territory to India after the 2020 border clashes between the two.
Bangladesh, on the other hand, complained India’s construction of dams over transboundary rivers like Teesta, Brahmaputra, Barak Rivers, etc.[6]. Specifically, Bangladesh protested the planned construction of 1500 MW Tipaimukh Dam over the Barak River that originates from Manipur and flows to Bangladesh[7]. Sharing the waters of the transboundary Teesta River is a key contentious issue between India and Bangladesh. The latter sought an ‘equitable’ distribution of waters from the Indian part of the Teesta River[8]. Meanwhile, India objected Bangladesh’s cooperation plan with China[9] on the Teesta River management project in the Bangladeshi side[10].
Extractive industries, energy and infrastructure projects, and the establishment of protected areas and wild life sanctuaries as green climate solutions aggravated the multi-layered conflict in South Asia. The areas targeted for these projects are often in resource-rich and conflict-afflicted areas with ongoing self-determination movements and counter-insurgency operations, viz, North East India, Central Area, Jammu and Kashmir in India; Baluchistan in Pakistan; and Chittagong Hill Tract in Bangladesh, among others. The financing of harmful projects and false climate solutions by developed countries and through international financial institutions (IFIs), viz, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), World Bank, and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) incited multi-dimensional conflicts in the region.
More often than not, indigenous peoples and their ancestral lands are at the core of these development projects, including the aggression attached to the implementation of such projects.
For instance, in North East India, the ongoing plan of the Government to pursue 2D and 3D surveys for oil and gas exploration within and in peripheral areas of Zeilad Wildlife Sanctuary in Manipur caused tension between the Rongmei tribe and the Government. Villagers from several areas affected by the oil exploration held protest at Makuai Village on October 23, 2024[11]. Affected villagers in nearby Assam has also been protesting the extensive contamination and health impact due to the uncontrolled release of crude oil and gas by the Baghjan Oilfield of Oil India Limited since May 27, 2020.
The move to declare Zeilad Wildlife Sanctuary and Bunning Wildlife Sanctuary also in Manipur, and the expansion of Kaziranga and Dibru Saikhowa National Parks in Assam purportedly for climate solutions, along with coal mining, oil exploration, etc. faced resistance from indigenous peoples of Manipur and Assam. Manipur witnessed protests against plans to promote palm oil plantations too.
Another example of a project that is mired with controversy and conflict is the pursuance of mega solar parks as sources of renewable energy in India. Proparco, a French development financial institution has supported Azure Power for its mega solar power plant in Assam[12]. In October 2020, the police arrested 14 farmers for protesting the solar plant. Two months later, in December 2020, four farmers were arrested. The financing of another mega solar power plant by ADB in October 2024 has led to conflict with indigenous peoples over land rights. Villagers of Dhekiajuli, Assam protest the land alienation for the ADB-financed solar project on April 9, 2025[13]. The Karbi people complained that the same project will lead to forced land acquisition of more than 18,000 bighas (or roughly 2,400 hectares) of land and displace at least 23 villages in Karbi Anglong areas in Assam[14].
Large dams, which are considered as major emitters of greenhouse gases (GHG), are also being promoted as renewable energy resource and thus being aggressively pursued in India, Nepal, and Bhutan. These large or mega dams receive financing from developed countries and IFIs[15]. The 216 MW Upper Trishuli-1 Hydropower Project in Nepal, co-financed by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) with the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the ADB, has led to conflict with affected indigenous peoples, which then compelled them to file complaint with the European Investment Bank’s (EIB) Complaints Mechanism on October 8, 2018[16]. The ongoing effort to build the 11000 MW Siang Hydroelectric Project has led to much tension with the indigenous peoples of Arunachal Pradesh in North East India. The affected communities protested the arrest of community leaders and the imposition of emergency law, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act of 1958, that led to the militarization of the state[17].
Unfortunately, because of these supposedly ‘development’ projects and climate solutions, arbitrary arrests and detention, as well as threats to human rights defenders and community organizations, are increasing in North East India, Bangladesh, and Nepal, among other South Asian countries.
The aggressive push for extractives, renewable energy projects, and conservation projects across South Asia, several of which are financed by OECD countries and IFIs, is marred with indigenous rights violations, forced eviction, repression from law enforcers, inadequate appraisal of impacts, and unaccountability of project proponents. These projects also induced conflict and tensions within and among States – with the State and communities and among communities. Pursuance of projects with heavy climate implications and false climate solutions also led to the intensification of militarization, conflicts, and rights violations, such as in North East India.
The unilateral use and management of transboundary rivers, including the pretext of climate change solutions adds to another layer of conflict and tensions in South Asia, especially with the perception of large infrastructure and energy projects as weapons of developed countries to serve their political and economic agenda. The geopolitical competition and collaboration on water and other resource management between countries also adds to the complexity of conflict dimension in South Asia. Riparian States should desist from unilateral interventions on transboundary rivers and consider the lives and ecology sustained by rivers and the disaster and conflict potential of such interventions[18].
Climate finance from developed countries and IFIs should refrain from financing false and unsustainable development processes. Similarly, Governments should adopt a clear mechanism to hold corporate and financial institutions accountable for their harms on people, environment, and climate across all climate adaptation and mitigation initiatives. Climate finance and climate solutions should cater to the real needs and rights of indigenous peoples. Development processes and climate solutions should desist causing conflict and fragility in South Asia.
References:
[1] (2019, Febraury 4). A third of Himalayan ice cap doomed, finds report. The Guardian.
[2] Suzanna Dayne. (2024, June 24). Two years on, Pakistan is still reeling from its worst-ever floods. Think Landscape. https://thinklandscape.globallandscapesforum.org/68862/two-years-on-pakistan-is-still-reeling-from-its-worst-ever-floods/
[3] (2020, March 12). India China Water Disputes: Brahmaputra Conflict. Journals of India. Retrieved from https://journalsofindia.com/india-china-water-disputes-brahmaputra-conflict/
[4] (2024, December 26). China approves world’s largest, $137-billion dam on the Brahmaputra close to the Indian border. The Hindu.
[5] Venkateswara, Rao. (2022, December 11). China’s Proposed Super Hydropower Dam on Brahmaputra River is a Mega Concern for India. The Geopolitics.
[6] (2020, December 7). Bangladeshi Experts Voice Concerns about Chinese Plans for Dam on Brahmaputra’s Upper Reaches. Benar News.
[7] (2019). Hasina discuss controversial dam with Manmohan Singh. The Times of India.
[8] Varun, B. (2021, April – June). Hydro Diplomacy between India and Bangladesh: A Challenging Paradigm.
[9] Anuttama, B. (2021, April 9). India Must Settle the Teesta River Dispute With Bangladesh for Lasting Gains. The Diplomat.
[10] Pinaki, R. (2020, October 21). Bangladesh turns from India to China to transform Major River. China Dialogue.
[11] (2024, October 23). Manipur: Affected Villages Of Zeilad Wildlife Sanctuary Hold Protest Rally At Makuai Village Of Tamenglong District. North East Today.
[12] (2023, January 13). Assam to Develop 50 MW Solar Power Project on Recovered Land. Saur Energy.
[13] (2025, April 9). Assam: Dhekiajuli farmers protest eviction for solar project. NE Now News. Retrieved from: https://nenow.in/north-east-news/assam/assam-dhekiajuli-farmers-protest-eviction-for-solar-project.html
[14] (2024, December 10). India: ADB must stop funding the “Assam Solar Project”, which displaces indigenous Tribes in Assam. Indigenous Rights Advocacy Centre.
[15] Yumnam, J. (2012, March). An Assessment of Dams in India’s NE seeking Carbon Credits under CDM of UNFCCC. International Rivers, USA.
[16] The IFC provides US$ 190 million in the financing, including US$ 95 million of equity and loans from its account, and US$ 95 million as the implementing entity for other funding sources.
[17] Anupam, C. (2024, December 9). Himalayas: Arunachal government deploys central forces to counter dam protestors in Siang Valley. Down to Earth.
[18] Transboundary Waters. UN Water.