



EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE HUMANITARIAN, DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE NEXUS IN THE LAKE CHAD REGION

Leo Atakpu, Africa Network for Environment and Economic Justice (ANEEJ)

A. BACKGROUND

Lake Chad is located at the intersection of four countries—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger and is home to an estimated 30 million people of multiple and overlapping cultures and ethnicities.¹ Once one of the largest bodies of water in Africa, the size of Lake Chad has been drastically reduced since the 1960s due to a variety of factors, including overuse, climate change, poor enforcement of environmental legislation, and weak water resource management.²

Since 2009, the radical revivalist Islamic movement, Boko Haram³ has waged an insurgency from the less developed region of northern Nigeria. In 2013, the U.S. government designated Boko Haram a terrorist organization. A year later, in 2014, Boko Haram was identified as the deadliest terrorist group in the world.⁴

At the height of the conflict in 2014–15, Boko Haram controlled about 20,000 square miles of

land in Northeast Nigeria alone (20% of Nigeria) where close to 1.8 million people were living.⁵ In 2015, a coalition of affected and concerned countries—Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Benin—belatedly launched the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to coordinate and expand unilateral and bilateral military efforts against the insurgency. The cooperation facilitated by the MNJTF helped to turn the tide against Boko Haram militarily, but the group proved adaptive and resilient, reverting to suicide attacks and guerrilla tactics. In 2019 UNICEF noted that “more than 3,500 children, most of whom were aged 13-17, were recruited by armed militant groups between 2013 and 2017 and have been used in the ongoing armed conflict in northeast Nigeria.”⁶

This on-going crisis has had devastating consequences for over 17 million people in the Lake Chad region, more than half of whom are women and children and depend on humanitarian assistance. More than 2.4 million people have been forcibly displaced and are now living as internally displaced persons (IDPs) or as refugees, either in camps or in host communities across the region.

OCHA and UNDP (2018) have described the many underlying causes of the Lake Chad Basin crisis: high inequality, perceived social injustice, a lack of social service provisions, historic marginalization, inadequate economic opportunities, high levels of poverty, rapid demographic growth and the impacts of climate change and land degradation.⁷ Finding ways to scale up development interventions and improve their efficiency to address these structural deficits is critical. Marcy Vigoda, chief of the partnership and resource mobilization branch at the U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, has noted that:

“Ultimately the solution to the crisis needs to be a combination of continuing to address immediate humanitarian needs, strengthening the resilience of people in the region and looking at solutions for sustainable development, and then supporting political processes toward ... reconciliation, re-establishment of basic services, supporting local government, etc.”⁸

B. THE UNITED NATIONS HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN

This chapter examines the United Nations Humanitarian Programme in the Lake Chad Basin.⁹ It is supported by a number of donors through the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).¹⁰ This programme came about following a series of meetings aimed at finding lasting solutions to the crisis in the region. It is a response to crisis-affected settings, combining the predominance and sometimes necessary means of hard-security interventions and soft-security measures associated with political and development responses.

The goal of the UN Humanitarian programme in Lake Chad basin is to bring long-term solutions

to communities suffering the chronic effects of under-investment in social services, poverty, environmental degradation and climate change. It is designed to cover all three components of the Triple Nexus with the following objectives.

- Save lives by providing timely and integrated multi-sector assistance and protection interventions to the most vulnerable.
- Enhance timely, unhindered and equitable access to multi-sector assistance and protection interventions through principled humanitarian action; and
- Strengthen the resilience of affected populations, promote early recovery and

voluntary and safe durable solutions to displacement, and support social cohesion.

Under the coordination of UN-OCHA, the humanitarian response in the Lake Chad region is led by the Governments of Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and Niger in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolutions, with the international community working to reinforce and fill any gaps in support of Government-led efforts in the region. In line with this approach and commitments made at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, the humanitarian community in the Lake Chad region continues to strengthen the role of government counterparts and other local actors, including civil society and the private sector, in the response.

The Governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria adopted in June 2016 the Abuja Action Statement to better protect civilians from violations and abuse. The countries have made significant steps to implementing this agreement. In February, 2017, some 170 representatives from 40 countries, UN, regional organisations and civil society organisations gathered at the Oslo Humanitarian Conference on Nigeria and the Lake Chad Region. The conference was co-hosted by Norway, Nigeria, Germany and the UN and followed a civil society meeting with large participation from local organisations working in Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Cameroon.

At the conference, 14 donors pledged \$458 million for relief in 2017 and an additional \$214 million was announced for 2018 and beyond. Pledges were made by the European Commission, Norway, Germany, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, France, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Republic of Korea. Humanitarian partners agreed to further scale up their response to reach the most vulnerable groups threatened by famine, including children with severe acute malnutrition. Special attention was given to the protection needs of women, children and youth, as well as the need for longer-term

support and durable solutions for the displaced populations.¹¹

In 2018, another conference was held to discuss the situation in the Lake Chad region. This event was partly in response to a call from the United Nations that an estimated \$1.6 billion was required to help 10.7 million people in need of humanitarian assistance in the region. The conference, again co-hosted by Nigeria, Norway, Germany, and the UN, followed the Oslo conference in 2017, which had raised a much-needed \$672 million.¹²

Participants at the 2018 Conference agreed that a coherent, multi-year approach is needed, that integrates all available instruments to tackle the protection crisis and the root causes of the conflict. This was direly needed to pave the way for sustainable and resilient development of the region, and thus contribute to a better future for the affected people. The Conference also highlighted the regional dimension of the Lake Chad crisis, and the crucial role of local actors, cross-border cooperation and ownership at all levels.¹³

Also in 2018, member states of the Lake Chad Basin affected countries, with the support of the African Union (AU) and UNDP, as well as other international partners, adopted the Regional Stabilisation, Recovery and Resilience Strategy (RSS) for areas affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad region.¹⁴ This RSS was subsequently adopted by the African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) in December 2018.

The Strategy comprises nine pillars: 1) political cooperation; 2) security and human rights; 3) disarmament, demobilisation, rehabilitation, reinsertion and reintegration of persons associated with Boko Haram; 4) humanitarian assistance; 5) governance and the social contract; 6) socio-economic recovery and environmental sustainability; 7) education, learning and skills; 8) prevention of violent extremism and building peace; and 9)

FIGURE 1



FTS: <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/869/summary>
Source: UN OCHA

empowerment and inclusion of women and youth.

This program focuses on problems within the scope of humanitarian and development programming solutions, emphasising the need for adequate coordination and transition of actions and caseloads from humanitarian to development actors.¹⁵ The narrower double-nexus interpretation is consistent with the language of the Agenda for Humanity and New Way of Working (NWW),¹⁶ which describes this approach as best suited to “contexts where short-term humanitarian action and medium- to long-term development programming are required simultaneously in areas of vulnerability.”¹⁷ The Strategy aims to make development funding available ‘earlier’ and processed quickly.

There is currently a multi-year strategy that provides the overarching framework for a humanitarian response in north-east Nigeria for three years from 2019 to 2021. Within Borno, Adamawa and Yobe (BAY) states, the 2019 plan focused on the needs of 6.2 million of the most vulnerable women, men, girls and boys. The

Humanitarian Needs Overview remained an annual exercise to ensure that changes in the context are analysed and reflected.¹⁸

Funding for the UN Humanitarian programme is raised annually and on a multi-layer programming basis, usually from donors and benefiting countries. For instance, UN-OCHA reports that in Nigeria the humanitarian community reached about 5 million people with multi-sectoral response across the BAY states. This success was achieved despite access challenges, funding shortfall and unprecedented challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic, which increased the number of people in humanitarian need to 10.6 million from 7.9 million in January 2020. But at the same time, Figure (1) below shows that as of 31 December, 2020, only 51% of the \$1.08 billion required for the humanitarian response in Nigeria had been received, reinforcing a declining trend in funding since 2017.¹⁹

In Chad, with 6.4million people in need of humanitarian assistance, OCHA targeted 3.8 million for relief. Figure (2) demonstrates that funding received from donors was \$288.5

FIGURE 2



For more information and donors' details see: <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/907/summary>
 Source: UN- OCHA. <https://www.unocha.org/chad>

million, against a \$664.6 million target for total funding requirements for humanitarian needs in 2020, leaving a gap of \$376.2 million.²⁰

In 2019, the humanitarian response in Cameroon was the least funded in Africa (only 43 per cent of the requested amount was funded). This acute underfunding of the humanitarian response is leaving millions of people without vital humanitarian assistance and protection, reinforcing the cycle of vulnerability and violence. For 2020, the humanitarian response plan required US\$391 million. It prioritizes life-saving assistance and protection while addressing the root causes of the conflicts and looking towards lasting solutions that promote recovery and resilience. As of September 2020, \$290 million was still required.²¹

Niger had a better performance in funding received for 2020. Of the 3.8 million people targeted by the OCHA program, 2.2 million were reached. Of the total \$516.1 million total funding required, the humanitarian response plan received \$362.7 million representing 70.3% and leaving a gap of \$153.4 million. The

top five donors are: Germany: \$117.1 million (32.3%), USA: \$92.1 million (25.4%), European Commission: \$43 million (11.9%), Central Emergency Response Fund: \$23.7 million (6.5%) and the United Kingdom: \$14.1 million (3.9%).²²

In terms of achievements, between 2016 and 2017, stepped-up humanitarian assistance has saved millions of lives. Assistance is reaching more people than before as aid organisations increase personnel, previously unreachable areas become accessible, and donors support grows. For instance, concerted efforts by humanitarian actors and the Government of Nigeria helped avert the risk of famine in 2017. Also, the UN Humanitarian Program in Nigeria alone has provided life-saving assistance to over 5.5 million affected people (1.4 million women, 950,000 men, 1.8 million girls and 1.4 million boys) in 2018. While it helped stabilise living conditions for millions of affected people, significant humanitarian needs remain as the conflict continues. At present, it is estimated that more than 800,000 people are still in areas that are inaccessible to international humanitarian actors. In 2020, despite challenges, aid workers had already

provided around 5 million people with life-saving assistance in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states (BAY) States.

Furthermore, some displaced people have begun returning to their villages in all countries affected by the crisis in the Lake Chad region. They are mostly family breadwinners who return to their fields, resume fishing or

pastoralism to support the rest of the family staying back in displacement sites. This situation calls for more development assistance to consolidate the resumption of livelihoods, and support voluntary returns where possible. Between 2016 and 2018, around 51,000 people have gone back to their villages, mostly in island areas in the southern basin of Lake Chad. The trend was expected to continue.

C. EVALUATION OF UN HUMANITARIAN PROGRAMME IN LAKE CHAD BASIN

The UN Humanitarian Programme in the Lake Chad Basin is helping to some extent to address the root causes of the conflict in the region in accordance with the vision of the triple nexus.

For instance, since August 2015, 1.6 million people (378,000 women, 348,000 men, 510,000 girls and 404,000 boys) have returned to or closer to their homes and attempted to begin to rebuild their lives, indicating that conditions in some locations have improved to a relative extent in the region. In Nigeria, Adamawa State has seen the highest number of returns at over 750,000, and Borno State over 650,000¹³. Government-facilitated returns also started, including in coordination with military efforts underpinned by Operation 'Last Hold.'²³

The UN humanitarian program was expanded significantly in 2017, reaching over six million people with assistance and protection, and effectively averting a famine. But needs in the affected regions remain acute and persisted at large scale into 2019 and beyond. Without continued assistance, hard hit communities risk sliding back into distress. Eight months into 2018, only 40 per cent of the US\$1.5 billion needed to assist 7.8 million conflict-affected people in the region was received.²⁴

Also on the flip side, funding is tied to either humanitarian, development or peacebuilding activities, so there is little funding specifically for nexus programming. Humanitarian funding is in particular often ring-fenced to ensure it is used only for humanitarian purposes. This funding methodology remains incompatible with the triple nexus' long-term multi-stakeholder approach. There also remains a mismatch of funding timelines. Humanitarian funding is planned on an annual basis, whereas development and peace programming typically planned for one to five years. As such, most funding mechanisms remain incompatible with the triple nexus.²⁵

The protection of civilians remains at the centre of humanitarian response in the region being coordinated by UN-OCHA. Villages, towns and even sites hosting displaced people recurrently come under attack, hitting civilians the hardest. Kidnappings, fatal attacks, sexual and gender based violence, exploitation and abuse continue to occur.

The implication of the above scenarios, therefore, is that humanitarian action alone cannot address the root causes of persisting challenges and vulnerabilities. The conflict-hit areas in the region are also suffering the

chronic effects of under-investment in social services, poverty, environmental degradation and climate change. Schools, health centres, roads, water supply are non-existent or inaccessible. A humanitarian response is being linked up to development initiatives, and greater investment in development especially at the local level must complement humanitarian action.²⁶

The UN humanitarian program is helping to guarantee the rights of millions of people, such as the right to life, education and other basic needs, even though much still needs to be done. Some schools that were destroyed as a result of the conflict have been rebuilt, hospitals that were burnt have been reconstructed and put back into use. Houses, communities destroyed have been rebuilt and re-settled through the program in some countries.

In partnership with development and humanitarian communities, governments have begun to articulate concrete, measurable collective outcomes. These include three to five-year instalments towards the advancement of the 2030 Agenda in the region in line with the New Way of Working (NWOW). The UN and its partners have already rolled out the New Way of Working in Chad, where they agreed on collective outcomes with the Government in 2017. An example of NWOW in Chad is the building of community resilience and promoting local development. Guidance has been provided to partners in designing complementary humanitarian and development interventions and major donors in Chad have started implementing joined-up approaches in their development programming. As of 2017, Chad has also become eligible for the peacebuilding fund

and this pillar is now being reinforced in the NWOW.²⁷

OCHA is tasked with monitoring the Chad Nexus plan, with indicators of progress being drawn from existing information sources. Chad drafted a three-year *Collective Outcomes* plan in 2016, making it one of the earlier implementers. The *Collective Outcomes* process was driven by the Humanitarian Coordinator /Resident Coordinator, along with several government bodies, humanitarian and development agencies, and donors. Humanitarian clusters were also involved in an elaboration workshop to develop the Nexus plan.

In Nigeria, the Buhari Plan, as part of the UN-OCHA program, combines humanitarian action with recovery and economic development. The UN Country Team (UNCT) is working on a strategy to operationalize the New Way of Working in the Northeast. In Niger, the government has set up a humanitarian-development committee and is resolved to transcend the humanitarian-development institutional divide. In Cameroon, the Recovery and Peace Building Strategy adopted by the Government has set out short, medium and long-term humanitarian interventions, as well as resilience and development actions.

The task of reporting on the Collective Outcomes, even at a basic level, has been challenging. Some of the existing reporting cycles for indicators do not match the annual reporting periods, nor are they collected on comparable geographic areas. Food security and nutrition heavily depend on weather and annual crop yields, potentially obscuring the impact of international assistance in improving medium-term food security. The outcome of increasing access to basic social services has

been considered so broadly as to be impossible to track, particularly given the shortage of national-level data.²⁸

Nigeria's security provisions and civil-military coordination mechanisms are quite conservative, making it difficult for aid agencies to reach populations in need. The United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) has been a key provider of air transport for humanitarian goods and humanitarian-development-peace personnel. But too often these enabling services are underfunded and therefore limited in the support they can provide to humanitarian-development and peace operations on the ground.²⁹

The implementation of the UN Humanitarian programme, therefore, must carefully balance humanitarian and development needs and ensure that they are prioritized over political considerations. This initiative also has to overcome many logistical problems. For instance, in some settings, such as North-Eastern Nigeria, it is impossible for development actors to operate. In that area there has been a major emphasis on the need to link humanitarian aid and development, but insecurity on the ground has meant that development projects have been slow to start.

A careful balance needs to be struck between speed and scale in the humanitarian response, with attention to conflict sensitivity, gender justice and working with national and local authorities. Adopting a nexus approach should never be a reason for not triggering a rapid humanitarian response in the face of need. This is a critical issue in the volatility of the Lake Chad region.

There must be respect for the fundamental differences between humanitarian and development approaches. Humanitarian approaches tend to focus on supporting those

most urgently in need. In contrast development work operates inside broader objectives of promoting *'the economic and development welfare of developing countries'*,³⁰ whereby the focus on the poorest and most vulnerable people is at times diluted.

For example, education supports children and young people's lifelong learning. It gives them the necessary skills to build a better future for themselves and their families, and to contribute to peaceful and prosperous communities. Yet too often overall humanitarian education funding is lacking in emergencies. For instance, UNICEF in 2018 called for \$41.7 million to meet the education needs of children in the crisis but received just 8 per cent of this amount in the first half of the year.³¹

What has worked? Adopting regional and cross border approaches in the region has proven to be helpful. Local authorities from the four Lake Chad countries are receiving assistance to collaborate on issues such as prioritization and the harmonization of programming approaches. For instance, the World Bank, Africa Development Bank, Agence Française de Développement (AFD) and Germany have further encouraged the formulation of regional frameworks to tackle common issues of governance, livelihoods, inequalities, trade, return and reintegration, and climatic, environmental and economic transformation.

There have been several lessons learned from work in Nigeria. It was shown to be important for donors, the United Nations and aid agencies to engage with the state level government in Borno to develop a Return Strategy and Policy Framework to avoid forced returns and promote durable solutions. To support this approach, the European Union developed an integrated funding package for Borno State. If this package is carefully implemented, it could

yield significant results for the region's nexus program.

It has been observed that throughout the Lake Chad Basin, humanitarian assistance is not delivered in a vacuum but rather where development work and peacebuilding are also taking place. To support affected populations, a joint analysis and planning are essential at the community level and beyond. This is especially the case for organizations such as UN with a dual mandate, with Nexus programs offering a great opportunity in this regard.³²

Nigeria's Regional Refugee Plan (2019/2020) focuses on Lake Chad Basin countries that are hosting refugees from Nigeria, including Cameroon, Niger and Chad. It was drawn up, for the first time on a two-year basis, under the shared responsibility of the UN Refugee Agency

(UNHCR) and the UN Development Programme (UNDP). The aim is to create lasting solutions for both refugees and host communities, an approach that makes good sense. The host communities' local populations are often living below the poverty line and in conditions where there is great gender inequality and inadequate access to a basic social infrastructure.³³

More than a year after the completion of the Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment (RPBA), the Cameroon government has yet to officially sign off on the accountability framework. This means that budget allocations, as well as legal/policy reforms necessary to enable the envisaged outcomes, have not been activated.³⁴ If the Cameroon government does not prioritise or advance nexus objectives, many of their development partners may also be unlikely to do so.

D. CONCLUSIONS

The intractable conflict in the Lake Chad Basin remains one of the most severe humanitarian emergencies in the world, affecting the North East of Nigeria, the Far North region of Cameroon, the Lake region of Chad and the Diffa region in Niger. The crisis has erupted in a region beset by chronic fragility where poverty, underdevelopment, gender inequality, mass unemployment and a lack of prospects for young people have fueled extremism. Environmental degradation and the impact of climate change have worsened an already harsh and dangerous situation.

The UN Humanitarian program is positive and should be continued as part of the way to achieve the purposes of the Triple Nexus in the region. It is critical that stakeholders urgently scale up development interventions to strengthen resilience, help people and

communities recover as quickly as possible from desperate conditions, and prevent a further deterioration of the crisis. To date, several approaches have been adopted, but they have had limited success. The current UN Humanitarian Program, undertaken by UNDP and OCHA, offers hope for greater success. Several experts argue that the nexus approach is a good option for the region. It has the potential to provide better coordination of humanitarian assistance, development support and peacebuilding efforts continuously and with increasing intensity.

If the UN Humanitarian Program is to provide a solution to the crisis, the people living in the program areas must trust the stakeholders. Groups working to provide solutions must operate beyond a limited mandate as a humanitarian or a development organization.

Rather they should be seen and accessed according to their capacity to work with local populations to meet their needs. This requires that local people be at the centre of all efforts. Strategies must be developed to strengthen their coping strategies and skills as well as their participation in decision-making. This approach will create an environment where relevant issues are raised and addressed, ones that relate to human rights to life and dignity and workable solutions are put in place to have these rights realized.

The good news is that there is significant political support and goodwill across all levels of the humanitarian, development and peacebuilding constituencies to work collaboratively to reduce needs and vulnerability during and after crises. However, how the Triple Nexus will work in practice, is still not clear. Funding and financing tools, instruments, policies and approaches have not had time to adapt to the Nexus. This remains a knot for all development actors to crack in the months and years ahead.

E. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

For the Triple Nexus approach to succeed in the Lake Chad Basin, the following conditions must be met:

1. Improved coherence and coordination.

Although effective mechanisms exist in all four countries to coordinate humanitarian response efforts, they do not exist for longer-term development programming. Improved coordination is essential for effective, efficient and targeted resilience programming, and to ensure that lessons are learned and shared across the entire region. It requires that the governments of the Lake Chad Basin set up and/ or strengthen development coordination mechanisms. It also requires that the international community allocate additional resources to support governments in this area.

2. New practical ideas for economic transformation.

There is universal recognition that economic opportunity is essential to recovery and resilience and to avoid further political instability. However, there is a deficit of ideas about how to achieve these conditions within the urgent timeframe and at the scale that is required. The crisis must be analysed in its broadest sense as well as in relation to the various groups affected (host communities, internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees, vulnerable groups, gender and age groups).

One critical concern is the large number of young people in the Lake Chad Basin, where almost two-thirds of the rapidly growing population is under 25 years old. To address this problem requires an urgent, local, national and sub-regional vision and practical strategies involving the private sector as a central actor alongside government, communities, international agencies and CSOs.

3. **Non-traditional approaches to peace.** It is important to explore the use of non-traditional peace brokers by promoting the participation of women in peace negotiations and rebuilding processes that capitalize on their nonalignment in conflict situations.

4. **Leave no one behind.** The UN Humanitarian program must be implemented in areas affected by the conflict as well as in areas not affected. Otherwise, tensions are likely to build up and the conflict will spread to so-far-unaffected areas. The focus on a comprehensive approach should not distract from the fact that humanitarian needs in the region remain high and must be met fast. It is particularly urgent to get access to communities that are currently cut off from humanitarian aid.

Recommendations for the implementation of the Triple Nexus include:

1. The need for investment in enabling conditions for a coherent response.

Country-level actors who lead prioritisation processes and coordination efforts currently have limited influence and tools to mobilise resources and stakeholders behind collectively agreed priorities. Investments should be made in reducing some of the barriers to a more coordinated response at a very practical level.

2. Resourcing country teams. Guidance is needed on how nexus approaches should fit with existing planning, prioritisation and resource mobilisation processes. Serious consideration should be given to whether top-down approaches or organic context-


driven collaborations for specific problems or locations are appropriate. Support should emphasise fostering and incentivising collaboration and complementarity and supporting the scaleup of initiatives that demonstrate results.

3. Funding workload associated with coordination. The workload associated with coordination across the nexus is largely unfunded outside the humanitarian community. Investments in gathering information, on who is doing what and where, and the identification of geographic, sectoral and temporal gaps, would help to improve evidence-based decision making and rational coverage of priorities.

ENDNOTES

1. Lake Chad directly borders Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Hydrologically, parts of CAR are in its active basin, and some of the aquifers connected to the lake are in Libya (World Bank, "The Lake Chad Development and Climate Resilience Action Plan," working paper, 2016a).
2. The landlocked lake declined from over 22,000 km² in 1960 to about 1,700 km² in January 1985 but has since increased again to an average of approximately 8,000 km² during the 2000–2015 period (World Bank, 2016a; see also World Bank, "Restoring a Disappearing Giant: Lake Chad," March 27, 2014b).
3. Boko Haram roughly translates as "Western education is forbidden." The group's official name is Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'ati Wa'ati Wal Jihad ("Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad").
4. In 2014, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) engaged in more attacks than Boko Haram (1,071 compared with 452), but the latter's attacks were more lethal (killing 6,644 compared with 6,073) (Institute for Economics & Peace, Global Terrorism Index 2015: Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, Sydney, 2015; Edward Delman, "The World's Deadliest Terrorist Organization," The Atlantic, November 18, 2015; Dionne Searcey and Marc Santora, "Boko Haram Ranked Ahead of ISIS for Deadliest Terror Group," New York Times, November 18, 2015).
5. *Boko Haram May Control Up to 20 Percent of Nigeria*. National Public Radio (NPR). January 2015. <https://www.npr.org/2015/01/13/377024729/boko-haram-may-control-up-to-20-percent-of-nigeria>
6. UNICEF, "3,500 child soldiers recruited in Nigeria," UNICEF Nigeria Research report, 12 April, 2019 <https://www.unicef.org/nigeria/press-releases/more-3500-children-have-been-recruited-and-used-non-state-armed-groups-north-east>
7. The paper is a product of a joint mission conducted by OCHA and UNDP in the Lake Chad Basin region from 2 to 13 July 2018. Led by Aliou Dia, with the participation of Stephanie Julmy, Salvator Nkurunziza, Antoine Haarman, Phil Vernon, Pia Hussein and Rodolpho Valente the joint mission travelled to Chad, Cameroon, Niger, and Nigeria to identify sustainable development solutions and areas of opportunity to increase the region's resilience. Its findings and recommendations were submitted in preparation for the follow-up High-Level Conference on Lake Chad Basin on 3- 4 September 2018, in Berlin, Germany.
8. The Agenda for Humanity includes a set of financing-related commitments under the core responsibility to "invest in humanity". Humanitarians have mobilised behind the 2016 Grand Bargain, a set of 51 commitments for reforming humanitarian financing. Development financing actors have focussed on the challenge of mobilising the huge resources required to meet the ambition SDG through the Financing for Development (FFD) agenda.
9. <https://www.unocha.org/story/lake-chad-basin-107m-people-need-relief-assistance-survive>
10. OCHA is the part of the United Nations Secretariat responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent response to emergencies. OCHA also ensures there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall response effort. <https://www.unocha.org/story/lake-chad-basin-107m-people-need-relief-assistance-survive>
11. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/oslo-humanitarian-conference-nigeria-and-lake-chad-region-raises-672-million-help>
12. Vince Chadwick, "Lake Chad meeting to take on humanitarian-development nexus, A blog 17 August, 2017. <https://www.devex.com/news/lake-chad-meeting-to-take-on-humanitarian-development-nexus-93305>
13. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1018382>
14. <https://www.peaceau.org/uploads/regional-stabilisation-recovery-and-resilience-strategy-rss-.pdf>
15. Case study research findings in CAR noted that during the humanitarian country team/UN country team (HCT/ UNCT) meeting to define the collective outcomes, the humanitarian/resident coordinator (RC/HC) clearly stated that they should be used to focus the work of development stakeholders on the causes of humanitarian needs, in order to reduce the humanitarian caseload and funding requirements. (CAR Case study – Culbert, 2019a)
16. See the 'New Way of Working' set up by the United Nations and the World Bank to deliver the nexus approach: World Humanitarian Summit, Commitment to Action, May 2016; See also OCHA, Collective Outcomes: Operationalizing the New Way of Working, April 2018.
17. OCHA, "Collective Outcomes: Operationalising the New Way of Working," April, 2018 <https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/financing-the-nexus-report/financing-the-nexus-report.pdf>
18. The multi-year strategy provides the overarching framework for a humanitarian response in north-east Nigeria for three years from 2019 to 2021. Within Borno, Adamawa and Yobe states, the 2019 plan will focus on the needs of 6.2 million of the most vulnerable women, men, girls and boys. The Humanitarian Needs Overview will remain an annual exercise to ensure that changes in the context are analysed and reflected.
19. OCHA (2021), Nigeria Situation Report. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Nigeria%20Situation%20Report%2C%203%20Feb%202021.pdf>
20. <https://www.unocha.org/chad>
21. <https://www.unocha.org/cameroon/about>
22. <https://www.unocha.org/niger>. Also see: <https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/908/summary>
23. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-humanitarian-response-strategy-2019-2021-january-2019-december-2021-december>

24. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/LCB_HNRO_Sep_2018_EN_web.pdf
25. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/nigeria-humanitarian-response-strategy-2019-2021-january-2019-december-2021-december>
26. <https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/lake-chad-basin-emergency-revised-requirement-and-response-priorities-september-2018>
27. had case study – Culbert, 2018
28. KIs Abuja, Maiduguri, Mogadishu, and Bamako. November and December 2018. https://publications.iom.int/fr/system/files/pdf/operationalizing_hdpn.pdf
29. OECD. *Net ODA*. <https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm>
30. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1018252>
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32. Fabian Böckler is an expert for disaster risk management with Plan International an independent development, and humanitarian organisation that advances children’s rights and equality for girls. fabian.boeckler@plan-international.org
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At least 15 people, including children, were killed when a Saudi-led coalition airstrike hit a home in the southwestern city of Taiz, Yemen in 2018. The air raid struck the house in the Dimnat Khadir district, an area that has seen heavy fighting between Saudi-backed government forces and Houthi rebels.

SOURCE: Felton Davis