Part II
Africa

Youth, Conflict, Security and Development

Dr. Yakubu Zakaria
Foundation for Grassroots Initiative in Africa

Introduction

A prominent feature of the post-Cold War Africa has been the upsurge of conflicts resulting in the colossal loss of lives, immeasurable suffering, human rights abuses, massive refugee outflows and disruption of the political and socio-economic lives of the people. The chronic and sometimes chaotic nature of African conflicts makes it a tiresome topic.[1] Indeed, any discourse of conflict or civil unrest in Africa has become a Sisyphean dilemma.

This paper explores intra-national youth conflicts or the role of the youth in local conflicts across West Africa. In particular, the paper examines the activities of youth-led ethnic militias in Nigeria, and child soldiers in Sierra Leone. The paper also draws from relevant experiences in Uganda and Kenya where the youth and especially children have been actively involved in conflict, often becoming its worst victims. Of particular significance are the negatives impacts of conflicts on children in northern Uganda and Kenya where the controversial religious group, the Mungiki, has frequently terrorized communities across the country.

Conflict in whatever form is often an uncomfortable and energy-consuming experience. Nevertheless, social conflict may lead to the positive or negative transformation of society. For Mayer (2000, pp4-6) "conflict is emotional reaction to a situation or interaction that signals disagreement of some kind. The emotion felt might be fear, sadness, bitterness, anger or hopelessness." It may suffice to say that conflict can be very destructive if not faced and dealt with in the most constructive manner. Usually, at the base of many conflicts or civil unrests is social injustice or at least a perceived notion of inequity. Experiences in many parts of Africa, however, show that sometimes conflicts may emerge out of selfish individual or group interests. Not surprisingly, the term "conflict entrepreneurs" has gained a considerable amount of currency in Nigeria where there has been a rising tide of intra-communal clashes during the past two decades. The current challenges to African governments and all stakeholders include improving the living conditions of the people and curbing youth restiveness.

Youth and the Impact of Conflict

A typology of intra-national youth conflicts in Africa shows that they can be categorized under the following broad issues: firstly,

Nigeria

conflict may be a product of ethnic competition for control of state resources. Secondly, conflict may arise as a result of fundamental religious opposition to secular authority, and thirdly, conflict may emerge out of state degeneration or collapse.[2]

Youth restiveness in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria, for instance, has been a complex mix of state degeneration and the struggle for resource control. The last four decades which followed the discovery of oil in Nigeria have witnessed the relentless exploitation of natural resources with little attention paid to environmental degradation or due compensation. Environmentalists are generally agreed that "every known law on environmental safety has been violated in this region." Today there are at least 150 gas-flaring sites in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Consequently, while the average rate of gas flaring in oil-producing areas of the world is approximately 4%, in the Niger Delta of Nigeria it amounts to 70%. In addition, there is an average of a weekly oil spillage caused by obsolete pipelines and vandalization by restive youth. These negative developments have led to the degradation of the natural environment[3] and colossal loss of human lives[4] and property.

The general loss of livelihoods from oil pollution and high unemployment rates in the Niger Delta has given rise to general anger and youth restiveness aimed at seeking redress for over four decades of neglect and deprivation by state agencies and their international accomplices, the multinational oil companies. Although the Nigerian government is believed to have reaped over US$ 350 billion dollars from over four decades of oil exploration and production in the region, this has not translated into any meaningful improvement in the livelihoods of the people. Over 70% of the people are in abject poverty, living below US$ 1 dollar a day. The absence of basic

infrastructure including electricity, water, health and education in the communities is in sharp contrast to life in near-by flow stations of oil companies where all these facilities and other attributes of the good life abound.[5] There is also a deliberate refusal by the oil companies to honor their obligation to communities[6] as are often contained in various agreements voluntarily signed with host communities.

As in Nigeria, youth-led conflicts developed in Sierra Leone and Uganda as a response to state degeneration.[7] In all these countries, state institutions have been weakened by decades of "corrupt predatory governments and elite functionalism". In Sierra Leone, the high incidence of corruption and mismanagement in the diamond sector was among the key reasons that precipitated the civil war. Besides internal factors, the brutal civil war in Liberia has had a spill-over effect on Sierra Leone. Indeed, Charles Taylor, the former president of Liberia, became the key player and sponsor of Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels who wanted to gain control of the diamond mining fields. Not surprisingly, the first rebel attacks into the eastern Kailahun district of Sierra Leone were launched from Liberia. Thereafter, Sierra Leone became the epicenter of conflict for several years (Morris, 2003). Like most African conflicts, the majority of the fighters and key actors in the civil war were young people and children. As the war progressed, banditry, abductions, rape, murder, and horrendous mutilations of civilians became the order of the day. Diamonds were the fuel for conflict in Sierra Leone as has been the case with oil in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria.

In Kenya, the collapse of state institutions, fundamental religious opposition to secular authority, and ethnic sentiments, led to the emergence of a controversial religious sect called the Munkigi in 1988. The

rising tide of unemployment and frustration amongst the Kenyan youth provided a fertile breeding ground for the recruitment of its members. Kenya's largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, provided the largest membership to John Maina Njenga's Mungiki group.[8] Since its formative years, the sect has left a trail of blood in its rejection of the trappings of Western culture. The banning of the Mungiki by the Kenyan government turned it into a secret cult with even more deleterious consequences. Children and women have largely been the targets of the Mungiki's violent attacks and humiliations.[9] Surprisingly, the African youth who constitute the promising part of the population have been at the forefront of some of the worst atrocities and human rights abuses in the continent.

Security and the development nexus

Security is a multifaceted concept, which goes beyond the traditional and narrow considerations of a state's military resources and its ability to defend national interests against both external and internal enemies. The state-centered approach is popular with realist scholars of international relations.[10] This rather narrow definition of security ignores individual and other forms of security, which are very vital for peace, and the safety of every society. Therefore, security definitions have to be broadened to capture the concerns of developing countries regarding food, environment, economic, political and the larger regional context of safety of human lives and property. Although food security may not be a relevant issue in the economically advanced parts of the world, it is a very serious and important issue in Africa because of its scarcity. The nexus between food shortages and political violence has been demonstrated in many African countries including Sierra Leone, Angola and Somalia.[11]

At the household level, food security can be described as the ability to "provide each member of the family, no matter their sex, age or physical condition, with an adequate supply of nutritious food on a sustainable basis". Consequently, national food security is feasible where every household is food secure. Paradoxically, a country may have sufficient food to feed its entire households but the food may not be evenly distributed. Furthermore, existing international trade policies may actually be the cause of food insecurity in many developing countries (Watkins, 1996). In Sub-Saharan Africa, where most of the economies are agrarian and dependant on commodity exports, there appears to be an inseparable link between food production and economic security. Economic security refers to access to resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power (Okoth, 2004, p49). Nevertheless, food production in the agricultural sector depends on overall national security. In many parts of Africa sometimes the fear of safety of lives during conflicts often compels farmers to move away from rural areas to the cities, leaving behind farmlands and food stocks.[12] This scenario creates acute domestic food shortages during civil unrest.

With the specter of terrorism haunting Western nations, developing countries with fragile economies and clearly different security concerns have been co-opted into the fight against a universal enemy. Tied to the notion of terrorism is the energy concern and particularly oil. The Gulf of Guinea has become an area of security concern to Western nations in view of its vast oil potentials. In recent times youth unrests in the Niger Delta have sent global oil prices skyrocketing.[13] As such, youth restiveness in the Niger Delta is not only a matter of security concern to Nigerian authorities but

to the governments of Western countries as well. Massive Western media coverage of youth restiveness in the Niger Delta has further added clout to the bargaining power of youth warlords for resource control.[14]

The link between development and conflict is quite teleological. At one end of the spectrum is a strong argument for development as the precondition for peace and security. From another angle, peace is considered a precursor of development. Nevertheless, studies on African conflicts show that the majority of those actively engaged in conflicts are unemployed or jobless youth with low-income backgrounds.[15] It is therefore argued that the absence of tangible development and job opportunities in developing countries has resulted in youth restiveness with disastrous consequences. Invariably, a very important starting point for combating conflicts and insecurity is through sustainable development or the creation of sustainable employment and wealth. Peace, however, is often seen as a precondition for development. The absence of it implies that no meaningful development can take place in any given system. The World Bank report on Conflict and Development (2005) observes that conflict is a critical obstacle to development in Africa. The report notes that 45% of all developing countries affected by conflicts are in Africa, where 15 million people are internally displaced. Insecurity, which constitutes a stumbling block to potential direct foreign investment, is a conduit pipe for capital flight in many developing countries.

The negative impacts of conflict and insecurity on the various economies and people of Africa have been tremendous. In most developing countries economic growth rates have stagnated sometimes even below three percent. In Nigeria, perennial conflicts have resulted in the illegal tapping of oil pipelines and bunkering by restive youth seeking ways

to eke out a living. Today, oil bunkering or illegal tapping of pipelines amounts to losses of 300,000 barrels of crude oil, which is equivalent to 8.5 million dollars a day. This negative development, which translates to a huge revenue loss to the government, has however, enriched youth leaders and turned them into warlords. A study on small arms in West Africa in 2001 showed a correlation between gun violence and underdevelopment. Consequently, the most backward areas of Africa are those that have suffered chronic violence, lagging behind in infrastructural, educational and economic development.[16]

For Himmelstrand (1994, p.18) development is a multi-dimensional process, which is tied to six criteria. First is a society's ability to use its natural and human resources to feed itself even under mounting population pressure; second is its ability to produce basic tools needed for food production; third is the institutionalization of shared rules for all actors in the system; fourth is the presence of indigenous entrepreneurs capable of propelling growth; fifth is the possibility of appreciable balance of trade; and last is autonomy and self-reliance. Paradoxically, all the six criteria necessary for development are only possible in an environment free from conflicts and insecurity. In Sierra Leone, the tenuous security situation during the war had devastating effects on the lives of the vulnerable people. The country's overall human development index, according to the UNDP Human Development Report for the year was "lowest at 175 on a scale of one to 175."[17] The Niger Delta, which is one of the most underdeveloped parts of Nigeria in spite of oil wealth, happens to be the most turbulent region in terms of youth restiveness. It may thus seem that for now the priority of African governments and their development partners should be the improvement of the quality of lives of the

citizenry in the areas of poverty reduction, employment, health and education.

Impact of conflict and insecurity on children

The United Nations report on the impact of armed conflicts on children, "exposed a moral vacuum in which all taboos had been eroded and discarded and a world in which children were no longer considered as precious (Machel, 1996, pp1-17)."

Over two million children across the world have lost their lives in conflicts during the past two decades. Three times as many of these figures have been seriously injured or permanently incapacitated by land mines. Two thirds of these are believed to be from Africa. Increasingly, children have become the targets and even perpetrators of violence and atrocities. In Sierra Leone the civil war between the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the government lasted between 1991 and 2002 and caused the deaths of tens of thousand of people mainly women, children and the aged, and caused the displacement of more than two million people. Significantly, well over one-third of the population became refugees in many neighboring West African States. As a result agricultural production suffered a severe setback. The targeting of women and girls by RUF rebels as a war tactic often led to mass gang rape and other atrocities such as the evisceration of pregnant females. Sexually transmitted diseases became rampant, as did unwanted pregnancies. Unaccompanied girls captured by combatants became sex slaves and victims of forced labor. Young girls unable to locate their families have turned to prostitution as a survival strategy.[18]

Human trafficking has been one of the negative effects of conflicts in West Africa. It involves "recruitment, transporting, transfer, harbouring, or receipt of persons through the use of force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power, or vulnerability, or giving and receiving payment to achieve the consent of person or having control of another person" (Lyday, 2001). The business of trafficking in humans in recent times is quite rampant in conflict-prone areas, and it is often organized loosely by groups involved in the weapons and narcotics trade, in collusion with government officials.[19] Victims are often children of all sexes separated from their parents as a result of war. Sierra Leonean and Liberian children have been trafficked to countries such as the Ivory Coast and Guinea as a result of war and the pervasive atmosphere of insecurity. This iniquitous traffic through which perpetrators often exploit and inflict immeasurable pain on weaker and vulnerable victims is difficult to combat because of the complex and clandestine way in which it is conducted.[20]

School enrolment has been on a drastic decline in conflict-prone zones of Africa. In Sierra Leone as in many parts of Africa, civil unrests have led to the destruction of school infrastructure. The general insecurity and dislocation of schools drastically reduced school enrolment in a country where the literacy rate is estimated at around 20 %. Generally, school enrolment in the conflict-prone regions of Africa is always lower than the national average. In Nigeria, the enrolment in the Niger Delta region of 45 % is below the national average of 68 %. Displacement of families during wars and civil unrest in Africa has led to the existence of child-headed families. Children as young as eight years of age have been known to care for their junior siblings following separation from adult family members during wars in Africa.

The negative impacts of the war in Sierra Leone have been disproportionately severe on women and children who were generally

Nigeria

malnourished. Health infrastructure was badly destroyed nation-wide, resulting in the mass exodus of medical personnel out of the country. This led to the deterioration of medical services nationwide. The images of child soldiers in Sierra Leone toting guns, and Ugandan children walking long distances to have safe shelter, sent shocking signals across the world. In Uganda, several thousand children known as "night commuters" leave their village homes for relatively safer and larger towns like Gulu.[21] The images of children sleeping in hospitals, schools and on veranda shops provide a nasty picture of the impact of conflict in Africa. Thousands of these vulnerable children have been raped, brutalized and forced to inflict immeasurable pain on others (OCHA–IRIN 2004). The use of child soldiers in northern Uganda's 19-year old war has ripped apart countless families and destroyed innumerable childhoods.[22] Paradoxically, child soldiers are double victims of war trauma and stigmatization by their societies for committing war crimes.

Youth as key players and victims

Young people everywhere in the world represent a veritable and important part of the society in which they live. A well-educated, skilled and productive youth portends a bright future for any nation. Conversely, an unskilled and poorly educated youth whose indulgence is hard drugs, crime, and violence is a great threat to societal security and sustainable development. Ironically, many African youth constituting the most active part of their societies are in the forefront of the conflicts. Many of the thousands of young people and especially children actively engaged in conflicts across Africa constitute "a generation whose childhood has forever been stolen".[23] Youth engagement in conflict may be voluntary or fortuitous, through forcible conscriptions by adult militias. Abducted children all over Africa have been conscripted into the rebel fighting forces in violation of international conventions. Most of these children, some as young as eight years, have their courage boosted through the use of hard drugs. In Uganda, More than 20, 000 children have been conscripted into the rebel movement since the beginning of the 19-year-old war.[24] In Sierra Leone, young children were sometimes forced to exterminate adults and pregnant women.

The legal protection of children was introduced into international law after the Second World War. Experience during the war pointed to the urgent need to draw up an instrument of public international law for protecting the civilian population. In Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention, children are protected in the same way as all "persons taking no part in the hostilities" (ICRC, 1984, pp140-152). Article 77 states that "children shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected against any indecent assault. The parties to the conflict shall provide them with care and aid they require, whether because of their age or for any other reason."

Children as young as two years of age had their limbs amputated by rebel soldiers during the war in Sierra Leone. Although nearly all countries in Africa are signatories to the Geneva Convention and international laws against crime, the grotesque human rights abuses across the continent suggest that more has to be done to ensure compliance. In particular, tough penalties and sanctions must accompany any violations of international human rights conventions. African countries must cooperate in the effort by the international tribunals to arrest indicted war criminals across the continent. There is also a need for the strengthening of education programs on human rights issues relating especially to children and women's issues in areas affected by conflict.

Nigeria

Interventions in youth, conflict and development

The year 2005 has been declared by the development community as the decisive year for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Consequently, if the world does not get on the right path this year it will be difficult to halve poverty by the year 2015. Although already in its fifth year of implementation, the evidence on the ground suggests that African countries are failing to meet the MDGs in the areas of food security, poverty eradication, employment opportunities, health and infrastructural development. There is today a general skepticism about the feasibility of the MDGs in tackling Africa's numerous social problems. A major handicap is that donor pledges for support have not been forthcoming or as regular as expected. In particular, the MDGs have been criticized for being too global without taking cognizance of the peculiar problems and development needs of poor countries. There is a need for detailed country-specific plans. In war-torn countries where basic health and educational infrastructure have been destroyed, the emphasis should be in replacing them. The UN does admit that while some countries could basically achieve the MDGs by themselves, African countries caught in the poverty trap have to be assisted.[25]

A recent call by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund has urged rich nations to do more in the areas of investment (NEPAD 2005). The report encourages developing countries to provide the enabling environments for private investment to thrive. In particular, the report noted that the MDGs and the aim of halving poverty are not likely to be achieved in the next decade unless there is a sharp increase in development aid, debt relief, and unfettered access to goods from developing countries into Western markets. Resources are being channeled to debt servicing, hampering domestic investment and the emergence of the African middle class. Thus for Sub-Saharan Africa to come out of its current economic quagmire, development aid has to be increased from $3 billion to $10 billion annually.

The relatively tepid response by the economically advanced nations to the plight of poor countries in their frantic effort to implement the MDGs has to change. On the home front, African governments have to double their effort to ensure security, and stable macroeconomic environments to keep inflation at a minimum. The private sector has a role to play in the realization of the MDGs. Private financial institutions can make credit accessible to poor and vulnerable people so they can escape their chronic poverty. Small and Medium Size Enterprises (SMEs) urgently need bank credit especially in conflict-endemic countries and regions to create employment and bring an end to youth restiveness.

Agents provocateurs and the youth

The rising tide of unemployment and the fear of a bleak future among the youth in African countries have made them vulnerable to the manipulations of agents provocateurs. These agents include aggrieved politicians, religious demagogues and greedy multinationals. Agents provocateurs are third party secret agents who deliberately exacerbate conflicts for personal gain. In some cases, such agents play active roles as mercenaries, or merely passive roles as financiers of conflict, or as rumor-mongers to stoke the embers of conflict.

In Nigeria, the unwholesome activities of agents provocateurs especially in the oil and gas sectors are becoming increasingly alarming. Here, multinational agents employ "divide and rule tactics" to cover their shady business activities. This involves the identification of a key opinion leader or a

Nigeria

group of influential people in the host community and paying them huge royalties to the detriment of the rest of the communities. The strategy encourages the emergence of rival groups, competition and violence among youth groups.

In recent times, payment of "sit-home-allowances" by oil companies to selected restive youths and warlords in the Niger Delta as a means of curbing violence has become a hydra-headed monster that continues to breed unemployable youth in the region. In particular, it has tilted the balance of power in favor of youth leaders and warlords who have enormous resources for the purchase of weapons.[26] A key reason for the emergence of these groups is that "ethnic militias and vigilante groups enjoy enormous but clandestine patronage from rich and highly influential members of their communities".[27] Influential politicians in Nigeria frequently use ethnic militias to terrorize their opponents to facilitate the rigging of elections. This has resulted in a circle of violence in the political arena. In Sierra Leone, rubber and diamond miners are known to have encouraged youth to foment trouble so that the illegal mining and export of diamonds could continue outside official control. The indoctrination of youth into the Mungiki religious sect in Kenya has had disastrous consequences for local communities. Agents provocateurs are also credited with the problem of arms proliferation in Africa. There is an urgent need for governments, civil society organizations and development partners to work together to curb the arms proliferation menace.

Youth rehabilitation and reintegration in post-conflict countries

Perhaps one of the most controversial and difficult tasks in the aftermath of every conflict is that of rehabilitation and reintegration of victims. The return and reintegration of refugees into their communities is an economically expensive process. Development agencies like UNHCR often get a fraction of their financial requirements to reintegrate displaced persons into their communities. This often leads to refugee lurch and frustration among displaced persons across Africa. In Sierra Leone there has been mounting anger against the United Nations and donor agencies for doing too little to reduce the plight of conflict victims. In particular, there is public frustration that the national and family reunification promised by local politicians and international agencies have not really materialized. With unemployment and poverty rates still on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, the task of resettling child soldiers and mercenaries is exceptionally daunting.

In many post-conflict countries including Sierra Leone and Liberia there has been a huge funding shortfall and the failed promise of education and skill acquisition, which did not come at the end of the civil war. There are disturbing signs of child soldiers' renewing their allegiance to warlords. More precarious and equally disturbing are the failures of disarmament programs and the inability of international organizations to fulfill their funding promises. Given their desperate socio-economic situations, youth gangs ignore calls from international organizations to renounce violence. The New York- based Human Rights Watch warns that unless alternatives are provided "war will continue to be seen as an economic opportunity" (This Day, 2005). This warning came as a result of the recent discovery that poverty was forcing thousands of young men to take up assignments in neighboring countries as mercenaries.

Nigeria

Crucial to the process of rehabilitation and reintegration is poverty reduction through employment creation. Above all, it requires the identification of key actors in conflict and the relevant mechanisms to apply in healing the wounds of traumatized victims.[28]

A recent World Bank Global Monitoring Report for the first Quarter of the year 2005 indicates that the socio-economic situation in the conflict endemic regions of Africa is getting more precarious without tangible signs of progress. Government implementation of policy reforms in these countries is relatively weak. Not surprisingly, 200,000 children die in Africa weekly from preventable and poverty related diseases. The Global Monitoring Report (2005) indicates that for African countries to be able to halve poverty by the year 2015, they need an annual GDP growth rate of 7%. At present very few in African countries are able to meet these criteria. Africa's emergency food needs currently amounts to US$1.8 billion, according to the World Food Programme. Paradoxically, global food aid has continued to plummet, dipping below current requirements.

Development aid is relevant especially in conflict-endemic and famine-stricken areas of Sub-Sahara to fill the resource gap. Enhanced and accelerated action has to be taken in the areas of health and education in conflict prone zones to cushion the effects of hardships suffered by displaced persons. This will require the combined effort of governments, development partners, civil society organizations and the private sector and especially multinationals in fulfilling their obligations in the host communities where they operate. Civil society organizations definitely have a role to play in educating youth against violence. In addition, they have a role in the areas of counseling ex-child soldiers and conflict victims and building capacities of youth in the area of skill acquisition for sustainable development.

Conclusion

The handling of the post-conflict reconstruction effort in Africa by the international community has been less than satisfactory. Post-conflict reconstruction refers to "a complex system that provides for simultaneous short, medium and long term programmes to prevent disputes from escalating, avoid a relapse into violent conflict, and to build and consolidate sustainable peace (Wayande, 2004)." The systems proceed through three broad phases, namely, the emergency, transition and development phases. Five dimensions have been recognized in post-conflict reconstruction systems which include: first, security; second; political transition; third, socio-economic development; fourth, human rights and reconciliation; and fifth, resource coordination, management and mobilization.

The poor handling of the post-conflict environment in Africa has created time-bombs waiting to explode. While the danger of renewed hostilities looms large in some African countries, international agencies continue to debate over who should intervene. With particular reference to the disarmament process, the World Bank, for example, continues to argue that "it is not a world government" and "this is a UN mandate"[29]. There is nevertheless a general consensus about the need for international financial institutions including the World Bank and the IMF to do more in funding post-conflict reconstruction initiatives in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. Urgent attention therefore has to be given to the disarmament, reintegration, resettlement and poverty alleviation programs currently being handled by relief agencies.

Nigeria

In contrast to the African region, international handling of post-conflict situations in Cyprus, Cambodia, El Salvador, Bosnia, has been more positive. To date, the United States has continued to provide support for the stabilization of post-conflict Macedonia, a gesture it has failed to extend to any post-conflict African country.[30] Indeed, a key element that has helped financial intermediation in post-conflict countries such as Bangladesh and Cambodia is the steady fulfillment of aid pledges on time, contributing to the stabilization of institutions (Duffield, 1999 and Smilie, 1998).

Adequate funds and timely fulfillment by donors are crucial in post-conflict situations. In particular, post-conflict infrastructure reconstruction, institution building and the provision of micro-credit facilities to vulnerable groups are necessary to jump-start the crippled economies of war-ravaged countries in Africa. One of the earliest experiments with micro-finance in a post-conflict, less-developed country can be traced to the early 1970s with the initiation of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (Nagarajan, 1999). Since then, the method has been applied in many post-conflict countries with varying degrees of success. Selected micro-finance programs in Bosnia, Cambodia, and El Salvador have shown signs of success and sustainability and can therefore be extended to post-conflict countries in Africa. Micro-credit is essential for the reintegration of returnees and displaced persons in post-conflict situations. In post-conflict countries such as Sierra-Leone and Liberia, the need for micro-credit support has become more imperative for families seeking to eke out a living.

Developing the local capacity to manage micro-finance schemes and improved coordination between donor organizations and local committees will ensure the sustainability of such schemes. Experience with refugee camps across the world shows that micro-finance and credit facility can be a major incentive and attraction for refugees to return home (Alles, 1999). There is a need for the international community and donor agencies to assist in the creation of jobs for restive youths as well as for the rehabilitation of special persons by providing them with alternative means of livelihood. Above all, the governments of post-conflict African countries must be assisted to revamp their agricultural sectors through the provision of subsidies to local farmers. At the global level, there is a fundamental need for the creation of a fair market for African agricultural products. The current global conditions with their unfair tariffs, quotas and phytosanitary restrictions must be urgently addressed to reverse the stifling of African economies.

Need for resource mobilization

It takes an average of ten years for a post-conflict country to return to the level of economic and human development conditions that existed before the conflict (Haughton, 1998). Prolonged conflicts have also disrupted fragile socio-cultural, economic and political structures and destroyed most of the transport and communications infrastructure. Foreign assistance is crucial for post-conflict reconstruction, reintegration and generational conflict prevention effort. Paradoxically, most of the donor pledges and support have become phantom aid as high-end human and administrative costs and bottlenecks tend to consume the assistance meant for impoverished countries. It is significant that while country-specific responses may vary, the early fulfillment of pledges will go a long way in ensuring that resources are put to proper use. Apart from financial resources, human and technical resources are also key prerequisites for successful post-conflict reconstruction and intervention programs.

Nigeria

The lack of harmonization of development assistance as rightly observed by the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation further buttresses the point. There is indeed, a need to find creative ways of properly targeting foreign assistance to emergency and transitional phases of a post-conflict country's developmental needs. Although local effort needs to be redoubled, many African countries emerging from conflicts are very impoverished and therefore require external support to handle the dire challenges on the ground. In spite of this, the need for synergy amongst African countries has become imperative in order to ensure coherence in post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

In recent times, big gaps have emerged between donor commitments and financial resources made available for post-conflict reconstruction efforts in Africa. Significant efforts need to be made to bridge the gap between donor commitment and resources that are made available. According to a recent Action Aid Report, total real aid flow to Africa is less than one-third of what is transferred to rich countries in interest payment on loans. Most of the aid to developing countries is phantom aid. This includes "amounts not targeted for poverty reduction", "double counted as debt relief," "overpriced and ineffective", "tied", "poorly coordinated", "too unpredictable", and "spent on administrative costs" (Bhattarai, 2004). Compared to a UN target of spending 0.7%, rich countries were obstensively spending 0.25% of their national income on aid each year. However, when phantom aid was stripped out, the figure came down to 0.1%.[31] The Action Aid report on phantom aid found that 61% of aid flows were "phantom" rather than real, rising to almost 90% in the case of France and the United States. According to Action-Aid (2004) the G7 countries – Britain, the US, Italy, France, Germany, Canada, and Japan – spent only 0.07% of their national incomes on real aid, which will need a tenfold increase to hit the UN target.

There is an urgent need for economically-developed nations to fulfill their financial pledges to African countries in order to end mass youth frustration and the temptation to relapse to conflict, which is increasingly seen as a lucrative venture. I agree along with Action Aid and others on the need for a new international agreement that would see money spent where it is needed. Post-conflict countries in Africa need more financial and technical assistance than is currently made available to build their war-ravaged economies. Consequently, future donor agreements must incorporate an African Economic recovery program to lift the continent out of its current misery. Indeed, there is a need for the injection of fresh capital for infrastructure building, reintegration of communities, and provision of viable economic opportunities that will ensure sustainable peace. It is only through a combination of effort, and timely resource mobilization and allocation that the challenges posed by post-conflict reconstruction in Africa can be successfully addressed.

Nigeria

Notes

1 For further reading on the nature and impacts of African conflicts see especially Fox (1999, pp.1-34).

2 On the typology of conflicts in Africa see Lodge (1999, pp1-5).

3 A recent study conducted by the Women's Aid Collective (WACOL), a local NGO, reveals that women in the Niger Delta were more concerned about the environmental implications of pollution, food security and family than their male counterparts. The study noted amongst others that seafood was getting destroyed as fish and periwinkles caught in the polluted waters smell of crude oil. See also Alamieyeseigha (2005) "The Niger Delta Crises: Yesterday, Today and tomorrow."

4 See for instance *The Guardian* Newspaper March 26, 2005.

5 For additional information see *The Guardian* Newspaper April 8, 2005.

6 Shell, however, argues that it spends up US$60 million a year on community development in the Niger Delta, a claim which would make it one of the largest corporate aid projects in Africa according to Africa Confidential, April 2005, Vol. 6 No. 7.Shell's claim however, is in sharp contrast to the appalling conditions in Oiloibiri, the town in the Niger Delta which hosted Nigeria's first oil well. There is currently no power or running water or functional health clinic in the town after five decades of oil production in this oil capital.

7 The Lord's Resistance Army of Joseph Kony in northern Uganda is believed to be the offspring of fragile political and economic environments in Uganda brought about by President Museveni's attempt to entrench himself in power. See Tindifa (2002, 164-179).

8 See the *Sunday Nation* (2003), January 12, Nairobi.

9 Kanja (2003) writes in the *East African Standard* about the Mungiki's ultimatum to all Kenyan women to get circumcised or be prepared to face its wrath.

10 Wayande (2004, pp67-82) "NEPAD and Security in the IGAD region."

11 See Action-Aid Report on International Trade and Food Security (2003).

12 The negative impacts of conflicts on decline of rural agriculture in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda and Dafur region in Sudan have been well documented by the UNHCR and other relief agencies working in Africa. In all these countries acute food shortages have been attributed to the displacement of farming communities during conflicts.

13 A recent BBC Business News Report on March 21, 2005 indicates that world oil prices have risen on fears of a Nigerian Oil strike, exceeding $57 a barrel. The purported strike was the result of youth unrest in the Niger Delta region against major oil companies. Similarly, *Tell* Magazine No 25, June 21, 2004 issue, reports oil market jitters that have helped push world oil price to record levels as a result of the Nigeria oil strike.

14 See for instance "Fuel: the People's Revolt," in *Tell* Magazine No. 42, October 18, 2004.

15 See (Sesay *et al* 2003, and Esiwonke 2005).

16 For further reading on the cost of violence see Fleshman (2001).

17 Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World, Published for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, USA.

18 A Report by Reconciliation Resources Published in September/October (1997) provides detailed accounts of the survival strategies of war victims in Sierra Leone.

19 For further reading on human trafficking see for instance Agbu (2003) "Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case."

20 See Zakaria (2004) the "Almajiri Lurch and Disguised Forms of Trafficking in Northern Nigeria."

21 See OCHA - IRIN (2004) *When the Sun Sets, We Start to Worry: An Account of northern Uganda*.

22 The Ugandan government and the UPDF have however, denied the use of child soldiers, though in reality, child soldiers abound among the rank and file of the rebel movement. According to the UN in 2004, more than 80 % of the LRA fighters were abducted children. The rebel group in Uganda since 1988 has kidnapped more than 20,000 children.

23 See Machel (1996).

24 Christian Aid (2003, pp.1-3).

25 For further details see *Development and Cooperation Journal* No.3 (2005 pp96-97) and especially the interview text with Eveline Herfken, the UN coordinator for the Millennium Development Goal Campaign.

26 The *Tell* Magazine issue of October 18, 2004, titled the *Coming Storm*, reports that sometimes up to 90% or more of the proceeds the youth gangs get from the oil companies end up in the stockpiling of arms. In one of the interviews one of the youth leaders had instructed his followers to spend US $32,143 out of US $35,714 million to purchase weapons.

27 See Sesay *et al* (2003) *Ethnic Militias and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria.*

28 Lederach (1995).

29 See the Bretton Woods Project: Questions Raised Over the World Bank Post-Conflict Work, July 21, 2003.

30 See Kim (2005) Macedonia (FYROM) Post – Conflict Situation and US Policy, CRS Report for the Library of Congress June 17th 2005.

31 See *The Guardian* Newspaper, May 26th 2005.

Bibliography

Action-Aid (2003) *International Trade and Food Security*, Published by Corporate Centre Advocacy Function (CCAF), London.

"Oloibiri, Oil Capital," *Africa Confidential* (2005)April 2005, Vol. 6 No. 7.

Agbu, O. (2003) "Corruption and Human Trafficking: The Nigerian Case," *West Africa Review*, Published by the Africa Resource Centre.

Alamiesegha, D. S. P. (2005) "The Niger Delta Crises: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow." Being a Paper Delivered by the Executive Governor, Bayelsa State at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, March 15, 2005.

Alles, S. M. (1999) "The Small Economic Activities Development (SEAD) Programme for Liberian Refugees and Poor Ivorian families", Abidjan, Cote d' Ivoire: SEAD, The international Rescue Committee.

Christian Aid (2003) "Children in northern Uganda Targeted by the Lords Resistance Army," Alerting Humanitarian Aid to Emergencies, November 12.

Development and Cooperation (2005) "Bring the MDGs on to the Streets," being an interview text with Eveline Herfken; the UN Coordinator for the Millennium Development Goal Campaign, *Muslim Women*, Development Cooperation Journal, No.3, Volume 32, March.

Duffield, M. (1999) Development and Security in a Violent World: A Critical Policy Review, United Kingdom: Paper Presented at the Conference NGOs in a Global Future, February 1999, held at the International Development Department, School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham.

Esiwonke, E. (2005) "The Warri Crises," Being Paper presented at the Roundtable on *Management of Urban Conflicts in Nigeria*, Organised by the Heinrich Boell Foundation, Lagos February 10 – 11.

Fleshman, M. (2001) "Counting the Cost of Gun Violence," *Africa Recovery*, Vol. 15, December.

Fox, M. J. (1999) "Somalia Divided: The African Cerberus: Considerations on Political Culture", *Journal of Civil Wars*, Vol.2, No. 1, Spring, pp.1-34, Published by FranK Cass, London.

"Scandal of Phantom Aid", *The Guardian* Newspaper (2005), May 26th 2005.

Haughton, J. (1998) The Reconstruction in War - Torn Economies, Harvard Institute of International Development.

Himmelstrand, U (1994) "Perspectives, Controversies and Dilemmas in the Study of African Development," in Ulf Himmelstrand *et al* (Eds) *African Perspectives on Development,* James Currey Publications, London.

ICRC (1984) "Protection of Children in International Humanitarian Law," *International Review of the Red Cross*, No 240.

Kanja, D. (2002) "Get Circumcised, Mungiki Sect Tells Women," the *East African Standard,* Nairobi, April 23.

Kim, J. (2005) Macedonia (FYROM) Post – Conflict Situation and US Policy, CRS Report for the Library of Congress June 17th 2005.

Lederach, J. P. (1995) *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation across Cultures*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, New York.

Lodge, T. (1999) "Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa," in *Wither Peacekeeping in Africa?* Monograph No 38: April.

Lyday, C. B. (2001) "The Shadow Market in Human Beings, An Anti-Corruption Perspective, Paper Presented at

the Transparency International's 10th Anti Corruption Conference, Prague Czech Republic, October 7 - 10.

Machel, G. (1996) *The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children*, United Nations' Report, No GA/SHC/3382, November.

Mayer, B (2000) The Dynamics of Conflict Resolution: A Practitioner's Guide, San Francisco, Jossey Bass Inc.

Morris, J. T. (2003) *Africa's food Crises as a Threat to Peace and Security, Statement to the United Nations Security Council*, Published by the Global Policy Forum, April 8.

Nagarajan, G. (1999) "Micro Finance in Post Conflict Situations: Towards Guiding Principles for Action", Joint ILO/UNHCR *Workshop on Micro finance in Post-Conflict Countries*, September 15th – 17th, 1999, ILO, Geneva.

NEPAD (2005) *African Post – Conflict Reconstruction Policy Framework*, NEPAD Secretariat on Governance, Peace and Security Programme, June, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Reconciliation Resources (1997) "Gender and Conflict in Sierra Leone," Published in September/October.

Sesay, A. *et al* eds. (2003) *Ethnic Militias and the Future of Democracy in Nigeria*, Obafemi Wolowo University Press, Ile-Ife, Nigeria.

Smillie, I. (1998) Relief and Development: The Struggle for Synergy and Providence: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Occasional Paper no. 33.

"Outlawed Sects" Legacy of Murder and Mayhem, *Sunday Nation* (2003), January 12, Nairobi.

"In Search of Lasting Peace," *Tell* Magazine October 18, Lagos, Nigeria.

The Guardian Newspaper, March 26, 2005. Lagos – Nigeria,

The Guardian Newspaper, April 8, 2005, Lagos – Nigeria.

"Mercenaries Fuel West African Wars," *This Day* Newspaper (2005) Vol: 11 No. 3643, p.57, April 14, Lagos – Nigeria.

Tindifa, S. B. (2002, 164-179) "Peace, Conflict and Sustainable Development: The Experience in Uganda," *African Forum on Strategic Thinking towards the Earth Summit and Beyond World Summit*, HBF Publication, Kenya

UNDP (2004) Human Development Report 2004: Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World, Published for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), New York, USA.

Watkins, K (1996) Agricultural Trade and Food Security, Oxfam, Oxford.

Wayande, P (2004) "NEPAD and Security in the IGAD region," in Makumi Wagiru (Ed) *African Regional Security in the Age of Globalization,* Published by the Heinrich Boll Foundation's East Africa Regional Office, Nairobi.

Zakaria, Y. (2004). "The Almajiri Lurch and Disguised forms of Human Trafficking in Northern Nigeria," in UNESCO Report on Human Trafficking in West Africa, Nigeria, September 2004, Lagos, Nigeria.

A Critique of the Efficacy of Providing AID to Africa's Peace and Security Agenda

Dr. Martin R. Rupiya
Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria

"Development and Security are closely related – Security is a precondition for Development and the converse is true, Development is a precondition for Security."[1]

Introduction

There is a definite link between security and development. Africa is host to insecurity and lack of development as a result of endemic, protracted and unresolved conflicts that have created conditions that defy national, regional and even international security interventions. The conflicts in Africa especially since the end of the Cold War in the 1990s have stymied efforts to bring about stable, secure and effective governments. The causes of conflict have been varied. These range from ethnic differences, territorial disputes, control over resources, external factors and weak political regimes that have fallen prey to strong-arm factions and rebel movements.

Since 1990, several African states have collapsed, leaving countries in the hands of warlords or as default trustee territories in the hands of the international community. These include, Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) and Burundi. The continent has also witnessed at least three genocides. One has been publicly acknowledged, another ignored and the other left simmering without adequate international or continental response.

The first was in Rwanda between April to June 1994, followed by the unacknowledged and continuing genocide in Eastern DR Congo. More recently, evidence points to yet another pogrom in the Western Sudan, Darfur, from October 2004 to the present. Finally, protracted conflict scenarios have continued to dominate much of Africa, such as Algeria, Angola, the Sudan, northern Uganda, Eastern DR Congo, the Ethiopian and Eritrean border, Somalia, the Mano River Union countries of Liberia, Sierra Leone, and, more recently, Guinea, the Ivory Coast and Congo-Brazzaville. Africa now has the highest number of refugees, estimated at over 9 million, and over 23 million internally displaced peoples (IDPs) in the world. The perennial conflicts in Africa are also responsible for the spread of war-related diseases in many of its counties.

It is against this background that efforts to come up with a credible security response mechanism at the continental level have emerged. In this regard, the development has been closely followed by foreign aid extended

South Africa

mainly by the West towards strengthening defense and security.

Since its inauguration through the Constitutive Act in July 2002 the AU has attempted to establish organic structures under its Conflict Resolution Mechanism in an effort to correct security weaknesses among its member states. At the apex of the structure is the Peace and Security Council followed by a Conflict Strategic Assessment Unit under which is the African Stand-by Force (ASF). Below this structure are the five regional economic and security groupings (RECS) located in North, South, West, Central and Eastern Africa. However, despite this superstructure, the foundation of the edifice is still the nation state, which ideally has adequate and effective security structures that assure the security of its people from both internal as well as external threats. The same state must also have the ability to contribute towards the continental agenda of peace, stability and development. A state imbued with such a capacity can act as an effective arbiter between competing factions within society. As argued by one of Africa's ardent conflict resolution participant, South African President Thabo Mbeki, a robust and effective state remains an important precondition for stability and development.[2] Mbeki's thesis is that, in the absence of a strong central government, the existence of armed groups threatens the security of citizens, and that of the state itself.

While the AU has recognized security deficits both within states and within itself and therefore accepted external aid, what has been delivered so far appears to undermine rather than help achieve the peace and security agenda. The impact of aid to Africa requires critical examination to determine its utility towards realizing that agenda.

It is in answering some of the vexing questions that have arisen around external aid to Africa's security structures that this paper seeks to make a contribution. For peace and stability to become permanent features in post-conflict states, the capacity of the security building block – the state – needs strengthening. However, the external aid provided thus far in the form of ACRI, Wider Peacekeeping and RECAMP, has not contributed to that purpose. Instead, weakened states have collapsed, more people have been internally displaced or have become refugees, while conflict-related casualties continue to mount. A fundamental shift and realignment of security-related aid needs to be undertaken. But the responsibility for this change is both the donor community's as well as the recipients'.

The countries of Africa have turned to credible regional security arrangements to help augment their deficient national capacities. Examples abound in West Africa. The West African Economic Community (ECOWAS) and its military grouping ECOMOG intervened in conflicts in which the national capacity to resist was low compared to that of rebel groups. This was true in Liberia and Sierra Leone. A similar regional military deployment occurred in Southern Africa in August 1999, when countries organized under the Southern African Development Community (SADC) banner provided military assistance to a militarily weak Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo).

These events on the African continent confirm the trend of weak central regimes' having to rely on regional security structures to survive challenges from within. In both instances, the regional deployments preceded final intervention by the United Nations (UN) Peacekeeping Missions. UN Peacekeeping Missions have hovered around the 50,000 troop mark in the various conflict situations on the African continent.

But have the various layers of security at regional and international levels strengthened the weak states of Africa? The

South Africa

evidence suggests that this has not always been the case. The deployment of UN Peace missions is expensive and uncertain as this relies very much on the willingness of the five veto powers and the contributing countries. Furthermore, events on the ground, such as in Somalia, had deteriorated to such an extent that the missions withdrew, leaving the country in the hands of warlords.

A similar situation occurred in Angola before the death of Savimbi in 2002. Consequently, the African Union (AU) has begun to develop a military capacity of its own, although it is still dependent on external support. The efforts of the AU in realizing its peace and security agenda has also drawn inputs from Western countries, in particular the United States and Canada and the members of the European Union (EU).

A look at the external aid to the African countries under threat reveals that the programs are separate and insulated from one another. ACRI operates without taking into account the existence of RECAMP, and vice versa. Furthermore, none of the initiatives operates in complementarity with AU – RECS or ASF arrangements. The Western initiatives – now complemented by a new Russian offer for Darfur – have not been in coordination with UN peacekeeping missions. Lack of coordination within and between the initiatives and the African efforts has created a chaotic situation, preventing external from having a meaningful impact on conflict levels and their consequences.

It is also true that all the external security initiatives which aim to reinforce the weak state are only temporary and cannot last over the long-term, given the expense and the sustained political will required. As a result, military support/aid has been limited to monitoring ceasefires, disarmament, transitional arrangements, elections and the immediate post-conflict era. Available

evidence suggests that, once the country moves beyond these preliminary phases into the post-conflict phase, its external partners quickly disengage in line with their temporary mandate.

There are a number of significant reasons why the African state has remained weak and fragile even after the end of the Cold War. The first reason is that the decolonization period after the 1960s failed to create the conditions necessary for participatory democracy, and instead led to the rule of the one-party-state, dictatorships and military rule. Superpower meddling complicated the situation. In Somalia, Ethiopia and elsewhere, non-democratic governments enjoyed the support of either the East or West, stunting the growth of democratic and other institutions outside the control of the political elite.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western-inspired "democratization" processes were unleashed but only further weakened already fragile African states. These processes have tended to destabilize weak "post-colonial" states instead of creating the conditions for their consolidation. Over 30 '"democratic elections" have been held between 1988 and 1993 in the 41 countries making up the Sub-Saharan region. The net effect of such elections in many cases has been to diminish the influence of the state through the rapid privatization of hitherto core state functions. Without a capable alternative to the strong state, and given the even greater weakness of a fledgling private sector, chaos was inevitable

Both William Reno[3] and Mark Duffield agree that the result of the neo-liberal political initiative in Africa has been "the re-incorporation of the periphery into the world system, carefully locating this zone on the edge of the global economy".[4]

Weak African states have called for regional support from other states. However,

South Africa

the capacity of regional organizations is uneven and in some cases non-existent. In such circumstances, besieged states have collapsed, amidst the wholesale destruction of infrastructure and the forced dispersal of skilled and knowledgeable human resources. As a result, national development has come to a screeching halt in the affected countries. The results of attempts by weak states to find support from the African Union (AU) and the United Nations (UN) have varied.

Antonio de Figueiredo acknowledged the African dilemma when he pointed out that:

> ...the African continent [was] left in such a social state by Western European colonialism..., facing famines, political chaos and uncertainty. The African Union is collectively working out a plan to break from both the dramatic consequences of colonialism and the problems arising from the restraint of neo-colonialism or the manipulations of post-colonialism.[5]

The recent submission by the UN High Level Panel also made a telling recommendation. It argued for *capable and responsible states as the only credible front line* to promote national security and development.[6]

Current experience and practice over the last quarter century have witnessed dismal and uncoordinated efforts at national, regional and continental levels. These initiatives must be seen against a background of complex insecurity factors that now include religious differences; self-sustaining war economies; the post 9/11 War on Terror; HIV/AIDS; and other characteristics underlying the continent's conflict system that have seemingly made recovery efforts even more more problematic.

The **Graph 1** illustrates the comparative levels of violence in Africa, measured against similar developments in the rest of the Developing World.[7]

Africa's new-found ability and capacity for violence after the 1990s reflects a region in turmoil. In contrast, Asia, the Indian sub-

Graph 1.   The incidence of civil war in Africa and other developing countries 1950-2001

Source: Gleditsch and others (2002).

South Africa

continent and Latin America, regions with zones that were previously battlefield theaters, are now generally enjoying the peace dividend brought about by the end of Cold War rivalry.

Evaluating the trends – response to conflict, security and development

Available data indicate that it was the United States, as the world's only super-power and self-anointed policeman, which first exhibited a willingness to curb conflict on the African continent. Its initial efforts included the deployment of forces under humanitarian auspices, but with a mandate to enforce compliance while creating entry points for traditional United Nations peacekeeping.

While in West Africa, the 1990s opened with a serious conflict in Liberia followed by similar events in Sierra Leone in 1991, in Southern Africa, Mozambique was emerging from a protracted conflict that had ended with the signing of the Rome Treaty of October 1992. While in all cases the UN responded by deploying Peacekeeping Missions, this trend was to receive a jolt following reverses experienced by United States rangers in Somalia in 1993. A paradigm shift and changes in policy towards deploying forces in Africa followed. One of the results of the shift is the *apartheid* structure/force composition that has since developed amongst the troops deployed in the continent. The US was not alone in this initiative as other European countries supported it. The most significant country, other than the US to manifest this change in policy is Canada, a country with a long tradition of peacekeeping but which has since switched its forces to Europe.

Much more significantly, Somalia was followed by the tragic genocide in Rwanda, during April to June 1994 in which over 800,000 people lost their lives. However, the decision not to deploy Western troops had

been made and from then on, Africa was faced with different versions of "developing the indigenous military capacity" as cited earlier. When a similar genocide occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1996, this was conveniently ignored.

The alternative to deploying a unilateral force after Somalia was a plethora of initiatives from the North. They include:

The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)
The first suggestion of an alternative to pacify African conflicts that were beyond the capacity of local states as well as that of the Organisation of African Unity was the US' African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI).[8] Then US Secretary of State Warren Christopher, during his tour of Central Africa in 1996, called for the creation of a peacekeeping force within African states of approximately 10,000 to 12,000 troops supported by between four to six Special Operations Companies[9] in Sub-Saharan Africa.[10] Such a force would receive Reinforced Training, Equipment, Logistics, Electronic Intelligence, Airlift, Force Project and Financial Support in carrying out a mission to protect civilians, provide humanitarian support and generally help resolve conflicts in Africa. US military personnel were earmarked for secondment from Fort Bragg in Northern Carolina.

In an important distinction, the US did not opt to recommend the creation of a standing army, but simply targeted the training of units within existing African armies for the purpose.

The political responsibility over such a force was to be under the UN Security Council or the OAU's Organ on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Mechanism. Implementation of the ACRI concept was rapid and extensive, eventually covering 70% of African states who received training and support at different levels.

South Africa

Table 1. *African Militaries Trained by the US since 1997*[11]

*Angola`	*Ghana	Rwanda
Benin	*Guinea	*Sao Tome & Principe
*Botswana	*Guinea – Bissau	*Senegal
*Cameroon	Cote d' Ivor	*South Africa
*Cape Verde	*Kenya	*Swaziland
*Central Africa Rep	*Lesotho	*Tanzania
*Chad	*Madagascar	Togo
Comoros	*Malawi	Tunisia
*Congo Brazzaville	*Mali	*Zambia
Eritrea	*Mauritania	*Zimbabwe
*Djibouti	*Namibia	Sierra Leone
Ethiopia	Niger	Seychelles

Table 1 reflects the countries that responded and worked with the US military.

Beyond this, ACRI operated more as a bilateral arrangement, offering military support to different African states that made the request.

If we examine ACRI/US support to the OAU, support has been directed at the Early Warning Unit, structures of the Organ on Conflict Prevention. Other support has been targeted to address complex emergencies and peace missions experiencing difficulties such as in the Eastern DR Congo or more recently, the debate for increased international intervention in Darfur. In all cases, funds to maintain the deployments have been provided by outside powers Canada, the UK, France and the US. For example, in 2004, the US provided US$42 million to the AU mission in Darfur.[12]

However, ACRI has not substantially changed the security situation on the African continent. One of the reasons for this is the emphasis on unilaterism and bilateral preference associated with ACRI. For instance, when the idea was broached in 1996, during a meeting in Kampala, represented African governments expressed the desire to be given some time to consult amongst themselves and then respond as an entity, probably through OAU mechanisms. However, within weeks, some countries had been invited and were participating in the ACRI programs while consultations were still ongoing. This has since robbed ACRI of continental status and diminished it with regard to regional engagements, but also limited it to desperate and uncoordinated national/bilateral engagements. The second reason for the failure of ACRI was the outbreak of war in the DR Congo, and the perception that some of the countries involved had used ACRI material to further their own ends.

Reinforcement of African Military Capacities (RECAMP)

The second suggestion towards strengthening African military capacity came from the French. This was in 1997 when the idea was first presented at the Franco-African summit held in the Louvre in 1998. The *Reinforcement of African Military Capacities (RECAMP)*[13] is based on the four principles of Multilateralism, Openness, Transparency and on a Standby

basis. Its stated aims are the three interrelated objectives of:

Providing peacekeeping training for African military in schools either in France or in Africa. The Zambakro Peacekeeping School in the Ivory Coast was to be the host, although the recent violence there forced a move to Koulilouro in Mali.

Training Multinational Forces. Targeted at Senior Officers, this would include politico-military seminars on crisis management and training exercises at Headquarters level without troops.

Addressing the lack of equipment amongst African armies without necessarily "arming" potential rebel forces.[14]

Providing field training, supporting local military schools, pre-positioning military equipment and assisting regional military organizations would facilitate the attainment of the above aims.[15] Military equipment storage sites have been established in Dakar, Libreville and Djibouti, giving the impression that this is primarily a Francophone targeted program, although some of these assets have been made available to other Sub-Saharan countries such as during the recent Southern African Development Community (SADC) *Tanzanite Military Exercise* held in Tanzania.

Apart from those indicated in the column showing US ACRI involvement, the following countries participated in the RECAMP initiative: Burundi, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Mozambique.

Wider peacekeeping – Britain

Third, the British, in 2001, came up with the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme as part of the multidimensional Conflict Prevention Pool (CCP). Although named "African", the program went beyond the shores of the African continent and included initiatives in Latin America, for example. The foundation of British intervention sought to build on its already extensive involvement in offering military advice and training through its teams around Ghana, South Africa, Uganda, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Namibia and other former colonies.[16] **Table 2** summarizes some of the countries and periods in which the British initiative operated.

Table 2. UK Military Training Programs in Africa[17]

Designation	Year Established	Location	Status
BMATT South Africa	1994	South Africa	Ongoing
BMATT Southern Africa	1995	Zimbabwe	Closed 2001
BMATT West Africa	1996	Ghana	Ongoing
IMATT	2000	SierraLeone	Ongoing
BPST	2000	Kenya	Ongoing

South Africa

Africa has really become a testing ground of theories and concepts by the more affluent countries. Another example was the arrival of a force under the auspices of rent-a-force by the UN, with forces drawn from the Scandinavian countries. This was in the form of elements of the Scandinavian and Latin American states, the Stand-By High Readiness Brigade for United Nations operations (SHIRBRIG).[18] Finally, The European Union (EU) also weighed in, operating under its mandate of cooperating with the UN the June 2003 French-led *Operation Artemis*, deployed for 90 days in the small town of Bunia in Eastern Congo.

UN peacekeeping missions
Finally, since the 1990s, the UN has deployed its biggest missions on the African continent. An average of plus or minus 50,000 troops has been mentioned as the level of force funded by the UN that has constantly been on the continent over the last decade and a half.

There have been or continue to be UN missions in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, the Sudan after the Naivasha Agreement, in Darfur, Liberia, Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, not to forget Western Morocco, and the Saharawi Arab Republic amongst others. However, in none of these missions have the causes of conflict been addressed or the post-conflict and reconstruction challenges met. What has been attended to are the preparatory phases in which actors are persuaded to engage in talks leading to peace agreements, followed by robust engagement in the supervision of treaties, ceasefires and elections.

What the above initiatives confirm is that there is interest, for various reasons, in maintaining peace, security and stability in Africa, although their aggregate impact has been negligible. But there is an obvious negative explanation for the presence of so many northern initiatives that have failed to address the fundamental causes of conflict on the African continent. More specifically, their presence appears to reflect agendas that go beyond attempting to address the continent's problems. For example, the external initiatives significantly do not seek to harmonize capabilities with each other and as a result, tend to have insignificant impact on the conflicts on the ground. Where it seems possible to muster resources and provide some common cause, strategy and doctrine, the northern intervention appears to encourage divisions and unilaterism, even marginalizing the important coordination role that is supposed to be the United Nations'.

It is against this background that African leaders soon became convinced that if they did not take things into their own hands there was little substantive and fundamental intervention that could be expected from outside. Based on this conviction, during the late 1990s, the continent moved towards re-conceptualizing the defense and security agenda with a view to creating its own structures, capacity and capability to respond to the challenges.

What the above summary of external military support demonstrates is that the different regional, international and Western initiatives that have attempted to strengthen the African state have met with little success. There is therefore a need to consider other complementary options to attain this key objective.

Timothy Edwards makes an important observation on the struggle between those "concerned with the militarized formations of the state" against those — generally from the development community — taking a wider view.[19] Over the last decade and a half, both have managed to find common ground around which their divergent interests appear to co-exist but with little abandonment of prior positions held. Perhaps

South Africa

what is missing from the external initiatives is precisely that "wider view."

The African response

Given our assessment of the nature of deteriorating security conditions in Africa in the 1990s and the attempts to intervene by outsiders, we now turn to the efforts of the continental authority, the African Union and its member states.

In trying to combat the increase in internecine conflict, it was soon clear that local armies were (a) desperately and inadequately prepared, and b) lacked the capacity to respond. In fact, in some cases, national armies disintegrated into factionalism and became part of the problem. This was true in Somalia, Rwanda, DR Congo, Burundi, Liberia and Sierra Leon to name but a few. Consequently, regional security initiatives came to the fore. The West African Monitoring Group ECOMOG launched itself into Liberia and later Sierra Leone while in the mid-1990s in Southern Africa, a divided contingent made up of SADC Allies Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe also deployed troops at the regional level in the DR Congo. This example was soon followed by South Africa and Botswana, which sent troops into Lesotho in September of 1998. In 1996, the Famine and Food Distribution network of countries in East Africa were motivated to transform that relationship into a regional security structure. Four years later, the region established an Early Warning Unit. The foregoing demonstrates that in West, East and Southern Africa, regional attempts at addressing instability have been a common feature.

Secondly, the above developments provided evidence of some capacity within the regions that needed coordination at the AU level.

In 1993, the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Cairo and in July 2001. As the OAU prepared to

transform itself into the AU, a decision was taken in Lusaka to incorporate the Organ as part of the Constitutive Act. This was to appear as Article 5(2) of the CA, providing the Peace and Security Commission (PSC) with its mandate, which among others includes:

a) Promoting peace, security and stability in Africa, in order to guarantee the protection and preservation of life and property...creation of conditions conducive to sustainable development

b) Developing a common defense policy for the Union, in accordance with Article 4 (d) of the CA.

c) Confirming the right of the Union to intervene in a member state pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity, in accordance with Article 4 (h) of the CA.

d) Confirming the right of member states to request intervention from the Union

In order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4 (j) of the CA, Article 6 (d) and (f) also provide intervention for peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction as well as humanitarian action and disaster management.[20]

The **diagram** illustrates the hierarchical organization of the AU and its structures that relate to the PSC and ASF.[21]

The selected principles guiding the work of the PSC provide the legal basis in the area of security that departs from the previous OAU provisions. These provisions prevent intervention related to national crises unless invited.

Membership of the PSC is also drawn from four elements: the Panel of the Wise; 15 member states of whom 10 are elected

South Africa

Diagram. **AU Peace and Security Architecture: The AU PSC**

15 MEMBERS FUNCTIONING AT 3 LEVELS ELECTED ANNUALLY PROVIDES OVERALL DIRECTION	**PSC** — **FOR CONTINUNITY, INCLUDES:OUTGOING AND INCOMING CHAIRMEN, WHERE KNOWN AND**
	HEADS OF STATE — **AD HOC MEMBERSHIP OF NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES, AND**
	MINISTERS
	AMBASSADORS — **LEGAL, MILITARY, OTHER EXPERTISE**

AU COMMISSION CHAIRPERSON

CMD

EARLY WARNING UNIT

REGIONAL DESK OFFICERS

PSOD

PSC SECRETARIAT

REGIONAL COOP

RECS

UN

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

PEACE FUND

GENERAL PEACE FUND

SPECIAL CONTRIBUTION

THE AU COMMISSION:
THE OPERATIONAL ARM OF THE PROTOCOL
CHAIRPERSON TAKES APPROPRIATE INITIATIVES TO
PREVENT, MANAGE AND RESOLVE CONFLICTS

for two-year rotational terms, while five are elected for three-year terms. The rationale is to ensure continuity and institutional memory between the outgoing and the incoming who then both find a segment in place.

The PSC also provided for the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP) that guides the work of the African Standby Force (AFS), made up of 15,000 — 20,000 military, police and civilian police components. An important observation of the CADSP, adopted in February 2004, is that,

> *"... both the traditional, military and state-centric notion of the use of the armed forces of the state to protect its national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the less traditional non-military aspects which relate to the protection of the people's political,*

> *cultural, social and economic values and ways of life."*[22]

In its efforts at implementation, the AU adopted two phases, the first ending in June 2005 and ushering in the second, in which the ASF will be able to respond to a hierarchy of increasing conflict and security challenges. Furthermore, a priority list has also been suggested that begins with the establishment of a Planning Headquarters at the PSC, Addis Ababa location followed by five Regional Economic and Security Community (REC) Standby Brigades- each consisting of between 3,000 to 4,000 troops. The five are located in the North, Central, Eastern, Western and Southern parts of the continent. However, a quick assessment of progress reveals major limitations.

For example, there is little progress and political cohesion with the Arab Northern

Brigade (NorthBrig). There is some progress, announced in April with EasBrig in East Africa, that has been able to establish a planning cell in Kenya and a Headquarters in Addis. However, EasBrig also reveals the contradictions with the concept as Ethiopia and Eritrea are currently at loggerheads with troops facing each other on the border, separated only by UN peacekeepers. In Central Africa, Eccas, representing the Central African Brigade, has also marshalled a 2,177-strong force, and entered into a defense agreement with countries that still do not appear to possess the more mature institutions that are a precondition for success. There is relatively more cohesion with WesBrig [ECOMOG/ECOWAS] and SasBrig [SADC].[23]

Assessment of Readiness

There are serious challenges in meeting the lowest common denominator bar put into place by the AU related to setting up the ASF. One of the missing planks is of course the existence of a robust, confident and capable state within many of the 53 members. Many are still struggling with the basic phases of establishing a nation state. The legacy of colonialism has also left military organizations with different doctrines, standard operational procedures and sources of equipment and higher training. This has implications for an integrated force. Finally, there is the question of costs. In global terms, the skewed aid towards African security has been summed up as:

> "America gives Israel (population: six million: land size: same as Swaziland or Guinea Bissau) $3 billion annually in aid, while it gives 48 black African countries (population: over 600 million) just about $1 billion a year."[24]

A further worrying factor related to the funding is the understanding that

comprehensive conflict resolution and development is likely to come from equal support of three phases: the preparatory phase characterized by "compelling belligerents" to reach ceasefires, followed by the second phase of disarmament, demobilization and supervised elections. Once this is achieved, there appears to be little appetite left for the more long-term phase of post-conflict reconstruction and development. This third phase, that of peace-building is concerned with the resettlement and rehabilitation of both combatants and societies, but has found no offers of financial support. Consequently, most post-conflict situations have degenerated into war and strife within the first decade of ending the fighting.

The Tier One Brigade or Combat Team concept[25]

In the interim period before the ASF is ready, the African Chiefs of Defence Staffs have recommended that units from lead nations, made up of coalitions of the willing, in practice, Nigeria and South Africa, take more prominent positions, offering contingents to fill the gap.

However, this ties in with yet another idea that is being canvassed, that of relying on a Tier One Brigade or Combat Team.[26] The alternative to the more elaborate ASF is the 'Tier One Brigade' or composite Combat Team. Key elements of this, it is argued, already exist amongst the African armies. Secondly, the establishment of a single brigade at Headquarters also circumvents all the challenges raised in trying to do the same at the regional level with the RECS. A further advantage is that a Tier One Brigade option obviates the real limitation of RECS to deploy in their own neighborhoods. Finally, a Tier One Brigade could be operational within a year as opposed to the five-year expectation expressed by the AU for the ASF.

South Africa

The UN Panel of Experts mechanism operating in Africa

It was at the height of the responses to conflict, violence and wars in Africa by both local and external actors when a facet emerged whose potential and impact continue to be relevant in the post-conflict and reconstruction phase: the UN Panel of Experts Mechanism. The value of this facility first emerged under the then Canadian Ambassador to the UN, Robert Fowler, when he initiated the establishment of such a commission in response to increasing use of natural resources — diamonds — to fuel the civil war in Angola by the late leader of the Union for the Total Liberation of Angola (UNITA) Jonas Savimbi. The result was the establishment of the *Panel of Experts to Investigate UNITA's Sanctions Busting in Angola & Recommend Detailed, Practical Action to Eliminate* in March 2000. The next example was the *UN Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DR Congo* in May 2001.[27]

When the panel of experts in both cases was established, there followed months of related information that they later presented to the UN Security Council (UNSC) being readily available in the public domain. However, because there was no credible entity to cite the information, and given the prejudices and machinations in the information arena, no one in a position of authority was prepared to respond and take corrective action. However, when the panel of experts started writing their reports, many actors, including multi-national corporations, were alarmed, leaning on their governments for their names to be expunged from the draft report while they also cut any links with the conflict theater. This development almost immediately removed the external markets for the "war economies" while accompanied by the very successful campaigns against blood diamonds and other minerals, including columbite from the Congo. The absence of foreign profiteers from Africa's conflicts also destroyed the networks that had been created through which weapons, ammunition and other support for rebel movements had been made. In the case of UNITA, even neighboring state corrupt officials were soon forced to stop their surreptitious activities for fear of international sanctions. Pilots and equipment, many drawn from Eastern Europe, were also forced to abandon flying into and out of the conflict zones with contraband for fear of being black-listed by international organizations.

Furthermore, the manner of reporting of the panels of experts was also unique. Accused countries and organizations are given right of reply, but no opportunity to destroy the gathered evidence, and it is interesting to read the texts when the *Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth in the DR Congo* and its *Addendum* was finally presented in New York. Many of the member states accused promised to set up "Independent Commissions of Inquiry". At the same time structured and organized state involvement disappeared on the ground, except in a few countries.

The impact of the Panel of Experts was due to its criminalizing any furtive and covert support actions by states in fuelling Africa's conflicts. This effect is also true in the post-conflict stages. For example, the weapons supply networks in Angola were disrupted and have not reappeared, leaving UNITA with the option of relying on Constitutional means to express their dissatisfaction with the political events in that country.

Given the difficulty of convincing the UNSC to authorize panels and the problems associated with providing additional funding against tight deadlines, the panel on the DR Congo recommended the establishment of a permanent commission. This has not been

South Africa

taken up, and given the nature of conflict in Africa, this aspect needs further highlighting for other forums, including this research initiative, to make the case again.

Creating a permanent, UNSC mandated panel of experts, at least for the next generation but seconded to the AU structures, will provide ready and necessary solid evidence to the world community on conflict areas such as West Africa, the Sudan and much more importantly, the Great Lakes Region.

Recommendations

Increase aid to Africa

All developed countries must increase their development aid to the level of 0.7% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as agreed upon internationally. Development aid is critical to lifting Africa from the present morass.

But as Charlotte Moore has pointed out, "only five out of 22 nations donate 0.7% or more: Norway – 0.87%; Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands." Those lagging behind include the UK, a country that has promised to "double its aid flows to 0.7% by 2013 and France,which provides 0.42%, has also matched the UK pledge."[28] There is a bizarre Anglo-French rivalry here while millions of lives are lost in Africa according to UN Humanitarian Chief Jan Egeland while addressing the UN Security Council on 11 May 2005.[29] United States contributions stand at 0.16% while that of the European Union is at 0.39%.[30]

The second recommendation is for donor countries to work directly with elected regimes that still lack the capacity to secure their territories as well as contending factions for power through military means. Targeted assistance both at the national and regional levels is likely to overcome deficiencies rapidly in the short to medium-term.

The third recommendation is to nuance the existing AU-PSC structure by adding a UN sanctioned, financed and mandated Permanent Panel of Experts. Its tenure could be temporary but designed to withdraw in parallel to increasing state capacity. To this end, a secondment period of twenty years is envisaged, in which the Panel would be located at the AU for rapid reaction to the continent's hotspots.

The fourth recommendation is to adopt the One Tier Brigade concept. This can be implemented in parallel to the more elaborate and therefore time-consuming and long-term structure of the African Standby Force.

Finally, it is recommended that attention and resources be provided for the reintegration and resettlement of former combatants in the post-conflict and reconstruction period. Many of the current peace processes have foundered on the anvil of failed DDR initiatives, leading to the spectacular collapse of new and emerging states.

Conclusion

Africa is replete with pseudo, weak, weakened and collapsed states, embroiled in power struggles to the detriment of a strong central state and the security of ordinary peoples on the continent. While the AU has developed, theoretically, a concept of peace support, in practical terms this has been left behind by practical deployments from the US-ACRI, France-RECAMP, the UK-Wider Peace Support Operations and even from the EU and Scandinavian countries. The tragedy however, has remained. External aid in security has failed to strengthen the African state as the residual entity in maintaining peace, law and order in the long-term when the external initiatives have pulled out. The structure and deployment of resources in the future, to culminate in the development of permanent peace and stability, must be a priority for both aid donors and recipients.

South Africa

Notes

1   Paraphrasing Netherlands Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Bot and Agnes van Ardenne-van der Hoeven, for Development Cooperation letter of March 2005, accompanying the Netherlands Institute of International Relations "Clingendael," two year study, *The Stability Assessment Framework: Designing Integrated Responses for Security, Governance and Development.*

2   See South African President, T. Mbeki budget speech to parliament, Cape Town, 25 May 2005.

3   William Reno "Markets, War & the Reconfiguration of Political Authority in Sierra Leone," in *Canadian Journal of African Studies, Vol.29 (2) (1995)* and Mark Duffield, The Symphony of the Damned: New Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies & Humanitarian Aid, *Occasional Paper*, Birmingham School of Public Policy, 2 March 1996 both references cited in Ankie Hoogvelt - *Globalisation & the Post*, pp. 114, 173-76.

4   Mark Duffield Symphony of the Damned - New Discourse, Complex Political Emergencies & Humanitarian Aid, *Occasional Paper,* (Birmingham Scholl of Public Policy, 2 March 1996, in Ankie Hoogvelt - Globalisation & the Post Colonial World - The New Political Economy of Development, Chapter 8, Africa: Exclusion & the Containment of Anarchy, p. 171.

5   Lest We forget: The Realities of Aid Discrimination in *New African, monthly magazine*, March 2005, No 438, p. 28.

6   See the *United Nations (UN), A/59/565, The 2003, High Level Panel,* recommendation 6.

7   Peter Gleditsch, Hegre Havard, Nils Peter & Ranyeing Gissinger, "Political Institutions Globalization & Conflict" paper presented to the 2002 Midwest Political Science Association National Conference, Chicago, Illinois, April 25-28. [footnote to be updated with published source of same article later]

8   ACRI - US at Http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1997/ 97082201apo.htm accessed on 4 May 2005; Major Barthelemy Diouf - Senegal http:// www.almc.army.mil/alog/issues/army/mayJune02/ MS749.htm; See also The US Army Professional Writing Collection featuring Creating an Effective African Standby Force by Lieutenant Colonel Mike Denning, Winter 2004-2005, at http://www.army.mil/ professionalwriting/volumes/volume3/january_2005/ 1_05_1.html, accessed on 3 May 2005, p.4.

9   A military company is anything between 120 to 150 troops.

10 Initially, the African Crisis Response Force (ACRF) had been mooted to respond to the evolving humanitarian crisis in Burundi. When the US failed to garner support for this idea from other developed countries, this was transformed into the current African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) as we know it today.

11 All the countries marked with an * asterik also participated in the French initiative as described below; *The European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa*, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Moris, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group), to the Inter-parliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 1 December 2004, p. 24- 25.

12 Antonio de Figueiredo, The Realities of Aid Discrimination, *New African March 2005, No. 438,* 29.

13 Eric G. Berman & Katie E. Sans *Keeping the Peace in Africa; Peacekeeping in Africa: Capacities & Culpabilities, (*Geneva, UN Institute for Disarmament Research & ISS 2000), in

14 *The European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa*, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Moris, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group), to the Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 1 December 2004, p. 20.

15 *The European Union and Peacekeeping in Africa*, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Moris, Rapporteur (Belgium, Liberal Group), to the Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly, 1 December 2004, p. 17.

16 *The European Union and Peacekeeping...*, p. 17-18.

17 *The European Union and Peacekeeping...*, p. 23.

18 With elements drawn from the 16 member states of Argentina, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Ireland, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden and the 5 Observer countries of Chile, Czech, Hungary, Jordan and Senegal. This has also been deployed in the Ethiopian and Eritrean conflict.

19 *Security Sector Reform: Concepts and Implementation, Report* for the Geneva Centre for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Workshop 20-22 November 2001, copy with author, pp. 1-5.

[20] *Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union,* pp. 5-8, document in the possession of the author.

[21] I am eternally grateful to a colleague, Henri Boshoff for providing up-to-date information on AU and the ASF.

[22] *Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy*, p. 3, document in the possession of the author.

[23] See also the quick summary by Eric G. Berman and Katie E. Sams, Keeping the Peace in Africa, *Disarmament Forum,* (200), pp. 21-31, 23, extract from book *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities,* (Geneva, UN Institute for Disarmament Research and Institute for Security Studies, 2000); *Constructive Engagement: Western Effort to Develop African Peacekeeping*, ISS Monograph No.33, December 1998 and African Peacekeepers: Partners or Proxies?, (*Pearson Paper No.3,* 1998).

[24] Antonio de Figueiredo *Lest we forget: The Realities of Aid Discrimination...*, p. 28.

[25] Lieutenant Colonel Mike Denning Creating an Effective African Standby Force, *The U.S. Army Professional Writing Collection*, p. 5.

[26] Taken from the UN report, "Monthly Summary of Military and Civilian Police Personnel," *Peacekeeping and Regional Organisations Report* (New York, August 1994 – 2004).

[27] Martin R. Rupiya, Employing the Instrument of the UN Panel of Experts as part of post-conflict reconstruction toll – Increased Security in Southern Africa, 1999 – 2005 (*ISS Occasional Paper*).

[28] Up Aid or Fail Africa-Paltry levels of aid 'seriously jeopardise' Millennium Development Goals,' in *Mail & Guardian*, 15-21 April 2005, p. 18.

[29] Africa: Too little funding too late may cost millions of lives, *IRIN News.org,* 12 May 2005.

[30] Up Aid or Fail Africa-Paltry...,p. 18.

Bibliography

Charles King, Ending Civil Wars *Adelphi Paper 308,* International Institute for Strategic Studies, (Oxford University Press, New York, 1997).

Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU), 11 July 2000, Lome, Togo.

 a) *AU Policy Framework for the Establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) and the Military Staff Committee (MSC) (Part I),* adopted by the 3rd meeting of the African Chiefs of Defence Staff, May 2003, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

 b) AU The African Standby Force and The Military Staff Committee (Part II – Annexes)

 c) The First meeting of the African Ministers of Defence & Security on the Establishment of the ASF and the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), January 2004, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

 d) Consideration of the Draft Report by the African Ministers of Defence and Security on the Establishment of the ASF and the CADSP.

 e) Eastern Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG) – *Communique on the Establishment of EASBRIG*, Ethiopia, 11 April 2005.

Protocol relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the AU, significantly embracing the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) *Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution* adopted in Cairo in June 1993, adopted by the 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU in Durban July 2002.

James K. Boyce, *Aid Conditionality as a Tool for Peacebuilding: Opportunities and Constraints*, drawing on *Investing in Peace: Aid and Conditionality after Civil Wars,* (Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (2002), pp1025-1048

Roland Paris, Human Security Paradigm Shift or Hot Air? *In International Security, Vol.26, No.2 (Fall 2001),* pp, 87-102, diagram p. 98.

Antonio de Figueiredo, The Realities of Aid Discrimination in *New African Magazine, March 2005, No. 438,* pp. 28 -29.

Intra-State Conflict and
the Role of Development Aid
The Greater Horn of Africa and the Ivory Coast

Lee M. Habasonda[*]
Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD)

Introduction

The role of development aid in conflict zones has become an important focus for many researchers and practitioners in conflict management and resolution. In many conflicts including those in Somalia, Uganda, the Horn of Africa as well as the Ivory Coast, the role of development aid is yet to be understood clearly. This is because the deep rooted societal conflicts in these countries do not follow any predictable patterns or cycles. Consequently, the impact of development aid is dependent on what phase the conflict has reached.

While development aid has been a facilitator of peace-building processes in some countries like Uganda, it has also worsened the security situation in others like Somalia. In a number of cases, development aid has not reduced inequality or delivered broad-based growth. This is leading to further inquiry into the links between globalization, development and conflict. The debate around the impact of development aid and conflict has also led to the fundamental questions of aid systems and their consequences to global peace.

In attempting to address these questions this article argues that if aid has to play a positive role in peace-building in the countries under discussion, it must be based on a careful analysis of the conditions surrounding its use, and, consequently, the nature of conflict. Both rebel leaders and aid workers openly acknowledge that aid, in addition to saving many lives, is a large factor in making it possible for belligerent groups to continue fighting.[1]

This article is divided into eight sections. The foregoing introduction is followed by an examination of the nature of intrastate conflicts. The article then looks at the role of development aid as well as that of agent provocateurs and their role in conflict. This is followed by a discussion on the dynamics of the conflict in the Horn of Africa. The article further discusses the modalities for conflict resolution and management and then addresses the role of the African Union and other regional blocs. The article concludes by suggesting the direction that aid must take.

Intra-state conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa and the Ivory Coast

In the greater Horn of Africa and the Ivory Coast warring parties have often cited prejudice and exclusion, struggles for control of disputed resources, or differences in

understanding how a just society should be organized, among the causes of conflict.

The conflicts in these countries are directed mainly against civilians and often fought by militias that are difficult to control. In Uganda, the Lord Resistance Army has been terrorizing civilians in the northern part of the country while in the Sudan the Janjaweed Militia has equally created havoc among civilians in the affected parts of the country. In the Ivory Coast the rebel groups have taken part of the country. This has disrupted cocoa production, the mainstay of the economy, a situation that has led to price fluctuations and unstable market prices.

It is also clear that these states (Uganda to a lesser extent) have weak governments, which make them susceptible to aligning themselves with foreign companies to market their resources globally and in return finance the war against perceived enemies. Conversely, because these governments are weak, they provide rebels an opportunity to extract resources whose profits enable them to sustain the war.

Scholars and other analysts have observed that such situations frequently result from processes of underdevelopment such as poverty, unemployment and food insecurity, incomplete state formation which does not allow broader participation or deliver effectively, and, at times state collapse.[2] Overall, these armed conflicts manifest an unpredictable and shifting emphasis between political and economic dimensions.

A number of economic aspects render these conflicts particularly difficult to resolve. This is because:[3]

- They are always self-financing and economically integrated at the regional and international levels;
- Competition for resources creates problems in terms of the command,

control and cohesion of both rebel and governmental forces;
- There is a proliferation of opportunities for self-enrichment over the course of a conflict;
- Diaspora networks, on which some groups rely for financial support, are difficult for third-party mediators to influence; and
- They involve complicated trade-offs between brokering peace and providing justice.

In a number of cases, the warlords in Somalia were peddling the agendas of the external forces that used them to maintain their commercial interests.[4] Much of the fighting in southern Somalia is fuelled by competition for agricultural production and marketing control. Somali warlords have come to resemble mafia leaders, financing their militia cliques through business enterprises and criminal activities. These same warlords are connected to Diaspora networks abroad. This could explain why despite numerous agreements, many were never implemented.

Furthermore, the destruction of natural resources on which an opponent depends has been used as a common form of attack. In the Sudan, oil has been a war commodity while in northern Uganda the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) has destroyed economic infrastructure, disrupted trade and taken control of contrabands. However, it must be noted here that unlike in other wars, most of Uganda's displaced people are inside the country and the illegal commercial use of natural resources has not been a feature of the conflict.

In the Ivory Coast, some residents believe that the clashes are more about cocoa than ethnicity. They observe that the expulsions of the so-called migrants always take place on the eve of the cocoa harvest.[5] This is in order

Zambia

to take control of the cocoa and sell them for their own profit.[6] This, however, is a build-up from the policy of *Ivoirite* which left sections of the country feeling excluded.

The role of development aid

Development and conflict theory stress the provision of aid in cases of violent conflict. Peace-building interventions during and after violent conflicts address the same concerns as development interventions. Clearly, development is at the core of pre- and post-conflict interventions, where the physical and social landscape has been damaged. In such cases development assistance is provided.

But development aid goes beyond development assistance. Aid refers to general support for the improvement of developing societies which may or may not be in violent conflict. Development aid covers long-term and short term needs, and therefore includes both development assistance and humanitarian aid.

The aim of aid is to assist the victims of armed conflict or human rights violations without discrimination in coping with problems of dysfunctional economic, political and social structures. Aid has many positive effects. It saves lives, relieves suffering, improves health, maintains health-care systems, places the victims' economy back on a sound footing, and also restores people's dignity. Within the greater Horn of Africa there have been massive humanitarian efforts which have contributed enormously towards the stabilization of the conflicts.

Many internally displaced people in Uganda, Sudan and Somalia have been able to cope due to food supplies, sanitation facilities, medical care, water and agricultural programs offered by an array of development organizations. However, aid has had some negative effects on the victims and local systems in these countries. In the Horn of Africa, aid has led to so much reliance that it has become the way of life. One can therefore conclude that it has led to complacency among the population towards finding their own ways of addressing their problems.

Aid has been so attractive to the people in the Horn conflict zones that they have become over-concentrated in aid distribution centers. This has led to overcrowded camps which have had their own health and security risks. Further, aid has enabled political leaders in the region to at times divert resources from socio-economic programs to those that they regard as more important such as buying arms or recruiting more soldiers. This has aggravated conflict. Beneficiaries of aid in Ivory Coast, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda have been targets of armed groups as follows;

- They have been harassed or pressured to relinquish part of the aid they have received
- Young men have experienced forced enlistment while young women have been abducted and forced into slave marriages.
- Large population groups have been displaced by armed groups when they assemble at food distribution aid centers.
- Sometimes big groups of civilians are taken hostage so they can be used as bait for aid which is then misused by armed groups.
- On occasion, humanitarian warehouses and convoys have been attacked in the Ivory coast, Uganda and the Sudan

Aid has also had the effect of significantly altering the lifestyles of its beneficiaries in these countries. Imported food aid for humanitarian purposes has also undermined

the local economies and made agriculture less profitable. This has been clearer in Somalia where people are engaged more in profit-oriented agricultural production since their basic food needs are being met by the aid relief provided. Experience has shown that when the aid comes to an end there are food shortages in the communities. In addition, aid can be interpreted as support to the existing political systems because it is often distributed in their name or misappropriated for their own benefit. Aid has in some cases generated clashes in the Horn. For example, relief aid to Somalia in the 1990s was manipulated by local authorities, hoodlums and even refugees who grew rich diverting food and other donations, or used these resources for political ends.[7]

 Another example is Uganda, where development aid has been tied to the condition of curbing defense expenditure. This in turn has made it difficult for government forces to acquire the arsenal needed against the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) which has proven difficult to defeat. However, analysts have postulated that if it were not for aid, Uganda's civil war would have been more wide-spread beyond the northern part of the country.

In the Ivory Coast, a network was developed between French and African political, business and military elites which thrived on French development aid. It provided many opportunities for corrupt practices. The stability of the country was tied closely to corruption and elitism built into the system by post-colonial French-African relations. Once this began to untangle, aid became a source of divisions and is seen as benefiting only people from the south.

From the experience of the Ivory Coast, Uganda, Somalia, the Horn and the Sudan, it is clear that working towards economic development alone is insufficient for an effective policy of peace-building and conflict prevention, and that the policy goals of sustainable development, democracy, human rights, viable political structures, healthy social conditions and healthy environmental conditions are interdependent. This implies the need for a comprehensive approach. In these countries it is clear that aid has produced parallel economies run by aid organizations which have not helped weak states like Somalia.

However, aid from the west has contributed towards demilitarization and reintegration of ex-combatants in the Horn through support for relief, education, capacity-building and job creation. Demobilization and resettlement programs have played a critical role in Ethiopia and Uganda. Aid has also been used to enhance the capacity of IGAD.

It is also true that even analysis in the provision of development aid has been euro-centric. Consequently, it has focused mainly on events and thereby failing to appreciate political and socio-economic structures in the greater Horn and the rest of Africa. This has created major obstacles to the viability of the state and/or policy mechanism that carry the seeds of violent conflicts.

Useful analysis should involve the actors and include the interest and power constellations of different groups, their resources and needs, their level of interdependence, their disposition towards the use of violence, and the existence of effective mechanisms for peaceful conciliation of group interest. Military measures of stabilization should also be taken into account. In addition, measures of development aid must be planned, designed, timed and implemented so they can help address the root cause of violent conflicts.

A commonly cited example of aid perpetuating a conflict is that of the Sudan,

Zambia

where civil war has lasted for two decades and billions of dollars have been spent on humanitarian aid. Both rebel leaders and aid workers openly acknowledge that humanitarian aid, in addition to saving many lives, is a large factor in making it possible for belligerent groups to continue fighting.[8] In this case development aid must be applied only after rigorous analysis of the needs of victims, and taking into account the socio-economic and cultural context.

By paying relatively high wages to local people employed by aid agencies, aid has also provided private incentives for the continuation of war.[9] Peaceful times do not offer employment in poor economies; hence locals fuel the situation to continue earning during civil unrest. Therefore development aid must provide incentives more lucrative in the absence of war.

Some aid has emphasized democratic structures in these countries. This is no doubt useful but democracy has to take into account the local institutions, practices and attitudes of the people. In most of these countries democracy is perceived as an abstract construct because people tend to be focused on immediate concerns such as survival.

Overall, aid is necessary because it eventually helps reduce violence through, among others, the presence of humanitarian personnel. It relieves and prevents suffering especially for silent forms of violence that are part of armed conflict such as hunger, thirst and disease which are all prevalent in the cases under discussion.

However, aid programs must be embedded in the political analysis of each country so that if assessments show political instability or security threats much of the aid is channelled towards averting such threats.

Agent provocateurs in the conflict

In both the Horn and the Ivory Coast, businessmen, politicians and militia or rebel leaders are the agents provocateurs. Businessmen have used the opportunity to create networks for illegal transactions with the outside world. These networks ensure that they benefit from the chaotic environment. Politicians use their influence to manipulate and even use food aid to gain support and wealth. Militiamen have levels of command where the resources looted benefit them at every level including acquisition of more arms. In general, they have used their positions to access resources and used their networks including Diaspora connections to maximize profits from products ranging from agricultural produce to minerals. Foreign commercial companies are also among the culprits. Some have taken advantage of weak governments in these countries to strike deals for exporting local products abroad, in return financing either the government or rebel group they are working with.

They have seized the opportunity created by the breakdown of political authority, legal institutions and social norms. This has opened up space for new opportunities, including organized criminal activities. In addition to illegal activities (for example trafficking in narcotics or children), armed groups and criminal organizations have gained control over significant portions of the formal economic sectors. In the Sudan, rebels sold oil through their external networks to raise money to buy equipment. This rise of black, gray and informal markets in any kind of accessible natural resource and illegal goods is best understood as neither a departure from "development" nor anarchy, but rather as the creation of new systems of profit, power and protection in a highly unregulated environment.[10] For example, cocoa in the Ivory Coast is seized from immigrants and sold at a profit by unscrupulous business people due to the breakdown of law and order.

Zambia

Criminality is a problem in conflict resolution and peace-building in both the Horn and the Ivory Coast. The profitability of illicit activities during conflict has driven continued conflict, encouraging the emergence of spoilers. Spoilers, especially local militia commanders, have discredited peace agreements.

Because criminal activities have become firmly established in these societies, it is difficult to root them out, not only because law enforcement and judiciary capacities are weak, but also because they serve a necessary economic and social function.[11] This is by way of becoming the points of service in the absence of government organized means of economic and social livelihoods. Self-appointed providers even of illegal merchandise fill the vacuum left by government. These providers link to the local militia commanders who in turn have connections to the outside world. Such activities demonstrate the extent to which contemporary internal conflicts have typically become decentralized and dependent upon external networks.

Indeed these economic transactions represent the "dark side of globalization", given that the same institutions driving the global economy, (economic and global transportation and communication networks) are also available to warring parties, whether corrupt government elites or rebel leaders.[12] The focus is upon goods imported and exported by rebel groups that are either themselves illegal (narcotics) or illicitly produced and traded (conflict diamonds and other gems, timber, minerals). This issue also includes trade undertaken by legitimate actors such as states and corporations, trade in goods that are legal but nonetheless impact upon war economies, commerce that occurs extraterritorially but is still closely related to the civil war, and the role of other actors not typically considered such as civilians for

whom activities engagement in cross-border trade is a means of survival.[13] In this regard, there are several types of "conflict trade":

- Bartering, such as oil traded for arms in the Sudan by Janjaweed militias who take control of oil production points and displace the inhabitants of those areas. This is done with or without tacit approval from government, and supplements military budgets from the regional governments that collect taxes as in Somalia, where the warring factions are heavily financed by their clans and business networks
- Developing an indigenous defense industry like the Sudan, where oil revenue has doubled the military budget and enabled the local manufacturing of small arms.
- Providing infrastructure and equipment for troops as in Uganda against other development needs. This means socio-economic targets are not met. However, donor aid has kept the country stable by supplementing those socio-economic needs

In other words, the Greater Horn of Africa region has seen the emergence of various war economies. Warlords and belligerents have made huge profits and amassed great wealth from the trade of illicit arms and consumer durables in areas under their control.

The often decentralized nature of the command structure, which allows local commanders to organize and fully control these activities, compounds the problem as it introduces crime and banditry into the society. Peace deals might compensate the senior leadership of various factions in post-conflict dispensations as is happening in Somalia, but overlook the local commanders who have a

Zambia

stake in the war economy and have more direct control over the means of coercion that make it all possible. It is hardly surprising that these individuals would be more interested in preserving the status quo and less interested in taking concrete steps to cease hostilities. Hence, peace deals must seek to dismantle the war economy by replacing it with a viable alternative.

The Horn of Africa: conflicts and regional dynamics

Since 1993 the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) has been actively involved in resolving conflicts in the Horn of Africa. In the Sudan it has made major progress towards achieving consensus on the declaration of principles in which conflicting parties, namely the Central government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement/ Army (SPLM/A) agreed on the principle of self-determination for the Southern Sudan. IGAD has also collaborated well with the UN and prospects of peace are now very high.

IGAD has also played a role in Somalia. The member states had mandated Ethiopia to facilitate political settlement in Somalia in consultation with neighboring states. However, regional efforts did not yield much result. The most recurrent and contributing factor to the failure of regional efforts to settle the Somali conflict is lack of coordination and the resulting contradictions among the simultaneous regional initiatives.(e.g., the Kenyan initiative and other efforts by Ethiopia). Whenever one regional actor took an initiative, another initiative followed, often with differing results. Apart from the mandated country, Ethiopia, other countries like Kenya, Egypt, Italy and Yemen have been active in Somalia. The absence of a recognized power and/or presence of multi-powers has increased the unpredictability of political developments in the country.

Since its independence Somalia has been viewed by its neighbors as a threat to the security of the sub-region. This is mainly due to the political ambitions it has pursued throughout its existence. All the regimes that have ruled Somalia constructed the basis of their legitimacy on pan Somali nationalism, whose major political goal is to unite the Somali people under a single state.[14]

In attempting to realize this goal, the Somali state had a series of direct diplomatic and military confrontations with its neighbors, whose governments it helped to destabilize. The most common Somali strategy was to provide military and logistical support to insurgencies and opposition groups fighting against ideologically or strategically hostile governments in neighboring countries.[15] This was exacerbated by the involvement of the super powers, which had different ideologies they wanted promoted in Somalia.

The Ethiopian military operation in Somalia and its diplomatic involvement in Somalia can be seen in the context of Somalia's being a threat to the Ethiopian government. With its mandate it ensured that it led the military operation as well as the diplomatic offensive to ensure that its interests are protected. The aim of such involvement could not be altruism. It appears to have derived mainly from self-interest that could only be realized through dictating the course of political development in Somalia. In this regard its purpose was:[16]

(i) To ensure that no organized threat could come from Somalia by attempting to influence the balance of power among the fighting factions. This would be by supporting friendly Somali groups to gain advantage in the ongoing power struggle in reconstituting a Somali state;

(ii) By gaining political and military influence, Ethiopia foresaw an opportunity to realize its long-standing geo-strategic ambition, including access to the sea; and

(iii) The assumption of regional hegemony could have been an important factor in Ethiopia's decision to become involved in the Somali conflict. Ever since Menelik II, Ethiopia has acted as a periphery hegemonic power which is facilitated through its relationship with European powers. Its sustainability has been strongly linked to this relationship. The current government attempted to revitalise its traditional relations with the west, mainly with the USA, which was weak during Mengistu's rule.

To date, Ethiopia continues to position itself as a regional power but the dynamics keep changing in the region. Active diplomatic and military involvement in Somalia is an integral part of the Ethiopian role as a periphery hegemonic power. At present there is no clear central hegemon in the Horn, and various countries are positioning themselves for this role. It is nevertheless clear that the lack of a principal regional power, like South Africa in SADC and Nigeria in ECOWAS, is a peculiar shortcoming in relation to the ability of IGAD to resolve the regional conflicts

The position of Ethiopia was recognized by the west when development aid and military assistance to Ethiopia increased during the 1990s. The anti-Islamic fundamentalism campaign of the western powers that reached its climax in the aftermath of September 11, 2001 provided an opportunity for states striving for regional hegemony. Indeed Somalia as well as the Sudan are believed to harbor international terrorist groups and thus Ethiopia will have no difficulty in substantiating its actions in that country vis-à-vis the west. But Kenya is likely to challenge Ethiopian ambitions, since Kenya seems to be asserting its influence considerably in Somalia as an ally of the US in the fight against terrorism following the 1998 bombings of the American embassy in Nairobi and the Israeli-owned hotel in Mombasa in 2002.

Modalities of conflict resolution and management

The underlying causes and dynamics of violent conflicts in Africa are generally not fully understood. In addition, efforts to analyze and manage them are not supported. African institutions that can effectively and democratically address the challenges of conflict and peace are few and weak, making the continent largely reliant on international organizations and foreign powers for leadership to resolve conflicts, with all the dangers and inadequacies such reliance implies.

There are, however, some significant African responses to this challenge. Intergovernmental mechanisms such as the defense and security organs of the Economic Commission for West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) show some promise. There is also a large number of NGOs.

One of the lessons that has been learnt in the Sudan about conflict resolution is that external political pressure can help the peace process. Indeed with the pressure from the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and IGAD, as well as foreign governments, political leaders have been pressured to change their policies towards the peace objectives. The external pressure has worked well in that it has been combined with adequate monitoring and a fair degree of trust and acknowledgement of good

Zambia

performance.[17] The aim has not been regime change but regime character change. This has led to the signing of a peace agreement. Prior to these agreements, although both the government of the Sudan and the rebel movements had reiterated their commitment to the ceasefire, breaches had continued and this is a sign of how fragile the process is.

In terms of conflict resolution, the Sudan is a test case of Africa's political commitment to peacekeeping and peace enforcement in line with the recently established Peace and Security Council of the African Union. In responding to the conflict between the Sudanese government and the rebel movements, the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice Equality Movement (JEM) and actions by the janjaweed militia, the continental body has deployed a peacekeeping force in Darfur.[18] Rwandan and Nigerian troops are in Darfur to help protect the AU ceasefire monitors. Parallel to the military response to Darfur are peace talks that have been held under the auspices of Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo in his capacity as chairman of the African Union. Substantive progress has been made and it remains to be seen whether the agreement signed will be durable.

Indeed regional actors have proved themselves better suited for conflict resolution than the major regional powers. In the Ivory Coast mediation efforts have been undertaken under the auspices of ECOWAS while the President of South Africa, Mr Thabo Mbeki, has been making efforts to help the country reach some form of settlement. So far good progress on this score has been made and President Laurent Gbagbo has indicated his readiness to review eligibility requirements for presidential candidates, a sore point in the political demands by the insurgents and the major source of conflict.

Despite this optimism, it is difficult to conclusively say the conflict is certain to end. This is due to rapidly changing conflict dynamics from the government and rebel sides. For example, there has been a deal to extend the term of office of president Ggbagbo for an extra year to allow resolution of the conflict. In fact a prime minister agreed upon by both parties has since taken office, but threats and counter threats continue.

In Uganda diplomatic efforts have led to the Ugandan president to offer a cease fire, negotiations and amnesty to the rebel movement.

The African Union and other regional blocs

The African Union (AU) is the major continental organization entrusted with maintaining peace and security. The AU has a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and this signifies the institutionalization of conflict management on the continent.

In addition there has been a revitalization of sub-regional organizations in recent years. Economic cooperation of West African states (ECOWAS), Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) which were basically formed to boost economic cooperation among member states have extended their mandate to engage in conflict management within their respective sub-regions.

Looking at the efforts of the AU in conflict, the tradition of adhoc committees has remained a dominant strategy. For example, in 1992, a Horn of Africa Standing Committee was established to address the conflicts in Somalia and they managed to organize the first all-party meeting among Somali warring factions in the town of Bahr-Dar, in Ethiopia. In fact other committees have been established for the Sudan, Uganda, the Ivory Coast and Djibouti conflicts, led by successive chairpersons of the General

Assembly. This strategy is based on Africa's traditional and pre-colonial methods of dispute settlement, whereby elders regarded as wise and commanding the respect and confidence of their respective societies intervened to resolve differences.[19] Though this strategy has been successful in some conflicts, such as those in Ethiopia, Rwanda and Burundi, it has delayed the institutionalization of African conflict management.

Unlike the OAU, the original line of non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign member countries, under the AU there has been a shift towards a policy of intervention in the internal affairs of a sovereign member state if there exist serious violations of human rights, or a potential for genocide in any country; if instability in one country can lead to instability in neighboring states; and if there is an unconstitutional change in governments.[20] The AU has come up with new norms and values which will enhance its capacity to intervene in and resolve African conflicts. The transformation of the OAU into the AU is a good opportunity for ensuring that these norms become shared and are translated into practical actions.

The most visible maneuvers have been through diplomatically-supported multinational interventions undertaken by sub-regional organizations, such as ECOMOG in the Ivory Coast, and IGAD in the Horn of Africa countries. ECOWAS for instance has responded quite well to a number of conflicts in West Africa. It is currently involved in peace efforts in the Ivory Coast where it has deployed a multinational West African force of cease-fire monitors. A team of West African mediators headed by ECOWAS Executive Secretary, Ibn Chambas is at work to bring peace in the Ivory Coast. A peace keeping mission is operating in the Sudan in collaboration with IGAD and there are prospects of increasing the strength of the

mission. However, the role of IGAD in managing conflicts is seriously and negatively affected by conflicts among its member states

However, AU is still mired in the difficulties of finding reliable means to solve financial constraints. While there is an AU peace fund in support of activities exclusively related to conflict management, the fund relies largely on extra-African generosity. The donor community is also collaborating with regional and local actors in providing development aid to these countries afflicted by conflict.

Conclusion

This chapter attempted to examine in general the crucible in which intra-state civil conflict has occurred in the greater Horn of Africa and the Ivory Coast and how they contribute to the local and regional dynamics of war and peace.

The mechanisms to resolve these conflicts must take into account ways of minimizing the benefits of prolonged conflicts and on this score, there is a need to build the capacity of the AU since it is the center for the UN and sub-regional organizations as well as states. This is probably where development aid can also play a role.

A number of areas need to be given attention. Good governance of natural resources must be promoted; measures are needed to control the trade in conflict goods through their accurate definition; support, developing and strengthening initiatives and regulation of arms is equally necessary. The use of development aid in reducing vulnerability to conflict such as by integrating better conflict analysis into the working practices of the donor must be promoted. Parliament, civil society and the media must put pressure on governments to assist background conflict prevention as well as promote and support local initiatives rather

Zambia

than just responding to violent or extreme events

It is in these areas where development aid could have the greatest impact. Aid could be used to mobilize the people to find local leaderships to champion their cause and the need to build national institutions based on the rule of law. Development aid should be heavily invested not only in humanitarian assistance and security protection, but also in rehabilitation, capacity-building and development. In this way the people in the conflict zones of the Horn and the Ivory Coast may begin to build their peace from points of strength.

Notes

[*] Executive Director of the Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD), a non-governmental organization working on issues of Peace, Conflict Management and Democracy in Zambia. He is also a lecturer of International Peace and Security at the University of Zambia in the department of Political and Administrative Studies

[1] Care must be taken to balance the positive and negative effects of aid so as to find a more beneficial position. Also see Branczik Amelia, for a detailed discussion on this in Humanitarian Aid and Assistance

[2] International Peace Academy (IPA), (2002) Political Economy of War and Peace, Seminar report, New York, P.2

[3] Ibid

[4] Nyuot Yoh, J. G. (2003) *Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa,* African Security Review Vol. 12 No. 3 P.8

[5] Irin news, http//www.irinnews.org/report.asp? ReportID=45355& Selected Region=West_ Africa accessed on 07/10/05

[6] Ibid

[7] See Maren, M. (1997) "The Road to Hell: The Ravaging effects of Foreign Aid and International charity," *African Quarterly*, Free press, New York

[8] Care must be taken to balance the positive and negative effects of aid so as to find a more beneficial position. Also see Branczik Amelia, for a detailed discussion on this in Humanitarian Aid and Assistance

[9] The extent to which this can happen throughout the economy must however be taken into account.

[10] Ibid

[11] Op.cit Tshitereke, C(2003), "On origins of war in Africa," *African Security Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2 Institute of Security Studies.P.85

[12] See note 25 above

[13] See note 2also

[14] Ghebremeskel, (-) A. Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: the Somali Experience. P.13. extract of the dissertation for the University of Vienna

[15] Ibid

[16] Ibid

[17] United Nations Security Council, (05/10/2004) Press Release on the Sudan, 5050th Meeting

[18] Ibid

[19] This was designed to keep in line with the adage African solutions to African problems.See also Resolving conflicts in Africa:Implementation options(OAU,1994),P21

[20] see the Constitutive Act of the African Union(AU)(2001)

References

Branczik, A. (   ) *Humanitarian Aid and Development Assistance,*

Chege, M. (1999) *Politics of Development; Institutions and Governance,* Background paper prepared for Africa in the 21st Century Project, Washington DC; World Bank

Collier P. and A Hoeffler, (1998), *On Economic Causes of Civil War*, Oxford Economic Papers, 50:563-73

Collier, P (2003), "Economic causes of civil conflict and their implications for policy in Crocker, Hampson and Aall (eds.)" *Turbulent Peace: The challenges of Managing International Conflict,* United Institute of Peace.

Duffield, M. (1998) "Post Modern Conflict : Warlords ,Post Adjustment States and Private Protection," *Civil Wars*, Volume 1, Number 1, Pp. 66-102.

Elbadawi E. and N. Sambanis, (October 2000) "Why are there so many civil wars in Africa? Understanding and preventing Violent Conflict*," Journal of African Economies,* Vol.9, No.3 P. 244

Ghebremeskel, A. (-) Regional Approach to Conflict Management Revisited: the Somali Experience. P.13. extract of the dissertation for the University of Vienna

Hubert, D. (2000) "Resources, Greedy and the Persistent Violent Conflict," *Plough Shares Monitor*, June, Project Plough Shares

Institute for Security Studies (December 2003) *Workshop Report on Strengthening the Role of IGAD in Regional Peace Initiatives and Post Conflict Reconstruction,* Institute for Security Studies

International Peace Academy (IPA), (2002) Political Economy of War and Peace, Seminar report, New York,

Kieh, G.k (2002) *The Context of Civil Conflict in Africa, Zones of Conflict in Africa,* Kieh and Mukenge, Editors, Preager press

Lodge T. (1999) *Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa,* Monograph No.36 Whither Peacekeeping in Africa?

Malmqvist, H. (February 2000) *Development Aid, Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief*, Monograph 46, Building Stability in Afica: Challenges for the New Millennium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sweden

Maren, M. (1997) "The Road to Hell: The Ravaging effects of Foreign Aid and International charity." *The online journal for African Studies,* African Quarterly, Free press, New York

Nyuot Yoh, J. G. (2003) "Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa," *African Security Review* Vol. 12 No. 3

Osman M. A. (2004) *Transition from War to Peace,* Geneva, University of Peace

Perrin, P. (1998) "The Impact of Humanitarian Aid on Conflict Development," *International Review of The Red Cross* No.323, P.319-333

Stewart F. and V. Fitzgerald, (2000) Introduction: Assessing the Economic Causes of War, in F Stewart and V Fitzgerald, *War and Underdevelopment,* Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford University, p 1

Svensson, J. (1998) *Foreign Aid and Rent-seeking*, Working Paper No. 1880, Washington DC, World Bank

Timmons, D. M. (2004) *The Sixth Clan- Women Organise for Peace in Somalia: A Review of Published Literature,* Geneva, University of Peace

United Nations Security Council, (05/10/2004) Press Release on Sudan, 5050th Meeting

Tshitereke, C(2003), "On Origins of War in Africa," in *African Security Review*, Vol. 12, No. 2 Institute of Security Studies.

van Nieuwkerk, A. (2001) "Regionalism into Globalism? War into Peace? SADC and ECOWAS Compared*,"* African Security Review Vol. 10 No. 2

World Bank, (2000) *Greedy and Grievance in Civil War*, Working paper No. 2355, Washington DC. World Bank

www.irinnews.org/ report.asp?ReportID=45355&SelectRegion=West_Africa, Accessed on 07/10/2005

www.saferworld.org.uk/publications/pubdemil.htm, Accessed on 07/10/2005

www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr990628.html, Accessed on 07/10/2005

The Securitization of Development Aid

Ayodele Aderinwale
Africa Leadership Forum

Introduction

While the Second World War indeed challenged some of the Idealist assumptions about the international regime, the last two decades seem to have reconfirmed some of the basic assumptions of the Idealist explanations of the global order, particularly the argument that interstate wars can be permanently controlled. What the idealists may not have envisaged is the emergence of powerful non-state actors and the implications of their activities for security at the national and global levels. While this may sound paradoxical, given that many countries are still locked in armed conflicts, most of Realist analysis is centered on interstate relations, and the conclusion on the probability of alienating wars can only be understood in this context.

For all practical purposes, current trends and developments indicate clearly that the Westphalian concept of the state can no longer serve as an adequate framework for structuring interstate relations. Emerging developments and trends have meant a gradual redefinition of the concept of sovereignty and with it accompanying interstate relations and interactions. Today, states are increasingly transferring significant measures of their sovereignty to supranational bodies. With the new wave of integration, regional blocs, which started out as merely economic blocs, are gradually transforming into political blocs based on a set of common values. In fact, regionalism has become the defining engagement framework in global politics. The move towards integration and regionalism also means a shift from antagonistic interstate rivalry towards a more cooperative approach to interstate relations. This further reinforces the Idealist position on the possibility of perpetual peace in international relations. Second, the emergence of supranational bodies and other powerful non-state actors has meant that nation states alone can no longer guarantee the security of their citizens in several respects. The involvement and engagement of other states and non-state actors have become crucial.

The security challenge

Perhaps the proper starting point would be to resolve the following questions; what is the essence of security? Who or what is to be secured, the State or the individual? Until recently, security was often defined in

Zimbabwe

traditional and purely militaristic terms and the State was viewed as the sole referent and agent of security. Such a notion of security meant in most cases that the essence of security is that of protecting or defending the country or community from external aggression and internal insurrection or rebellion. The state must be secured, and in most cases, at the expense of the individual. This is clearly a product of the lived experience and the historical antecedents of the emergence of the Westphalian nation state. But this is also borne out by the history of states. According to Dufour[1], before 1939, four conflicts out of five were between states; since 1945 four conflicts out of five have been internal, generally complicated by foreign interventions. Since 1980 there have been no more than a handful of interstate conflicts. However, since the 1980s when the nature and character of conflicts and parties to conflicts changed and became largely internal, the causes of conflicts have also changed dramatically and thus have rendered the traditional definition of security obsolete and archaic and generally unhelpful for all practical purposes.

In effect, it is generally agreed today that any instructive and enlightening definition of security must start from a basic appreciation of security as a multi-dimensional phenomenon that embraces all aspects of human existence. It is about broadening the frontier of human freedom and the expansion of opportunities and choices. It transcends the mere absence of war. It must embrace and be understood to mean the absence of all forms of threats and causes of insecurity, be it material or structural.

Under this concept of human security, the individual is the object of security who has to be protected from all forms of insecurity. This is defined to include but is not limited to threats such as danger, hunger, disease, environmental hazards,

homelessness, etc. People are expected to exercise their choices freely without any form of encumbrances. Invariably, the sole aim of political and socio-economic attempts is to guarantee the security of the individual and to provide him or her access to a range of choices.

Development on the other hand is about providing security through the equitable allocation of socio-economic resources and opportunities. It refers to change or transformation into a better state. The traditional conception of development had also been very narrow, and centered purely on economic growth, the ability of a nation to post increases in its gross national product. This definition did not take cognizance of the distribution of and access to socio-economic resources within different segments of a particular society, which is more often than not the root cause of conflicts and insecurity. With time, the concept experienced a shift from mere concerns with growth on the basis of per capita income to the more concrete issue of resource allocation and growth spread. Consequently, it became the norm to talk about economic development, rather than economic growth. The provision of basic needs, like housing, health, water, etc. became a shared value. The broadening of the concept, as Shoeman argues, occurred because economic growth failed to culminate in the expected "spill-over effect predicted by liberal economists."[2]

The link between security and development as a precondition for the sustainable transformation of society is often neglected and in fact has neither been recognized nor accorded the required level of consideration and priority in Africa. Elsewhere I have argued for a concentric approach to understanding security and that the three major layers of security— state security, regime security and human security— form three concentric circles and that discussions

Zimbabwe

often center on where the focus should be, whether on the state, the regime or the people.

> "The security of the State and that of the people is inextricably linked, encapsulated in the regime's security. The regime controls the decision-making machinery and the well being of the other dimensions is determined by the activities of the hegemonic fraction of the dominant faction of its power elite — the regime. All this can be illustrated by a figure in which regime security is at the center, followed by State security and lastly by human security. The psychology and approach of the power elite in this instance is to use the instrument of power and authority to concentrate resources on its survival rather than the survival of the State and the people. The aftermath of this is that the rupture of the fabric of human security will introduce the regime instability virus into the polity, build up pressure against state security, weaken and eventually consume the regime."

According to Olonisakin,

> "In such cases, the main pre-occupation of the security sector is with maintaining the regime in power rather than with meeting the objective security needs of the state. Invariably, an inordinately large proportion of that state's resources are consumed by the security sector at the expense of the productive sector. This pattern of governance in which greater attention is paid to the security of a regime as opposed to the security of the state has often provided the basis for conflict within many African states."[3]

Most countries in Africa exhibit this trend. The inter-linkage of development and security cannot be overemphasized. The consequences of misplaced priorities are the violent conflicts that continue to devour the people of Africa. When the frontier of human freedom is broadened within a particular society, the prospect for peace would be enhanced. All conflicts have their root in injustices arising from inequitable access to socio-economic resources and opportunities in the context of heavily biased and defective power relation structures that neither tolerate dissenting views nor accommodate minority rights.

Africa's quest for political and socio-economic development has not been encouraging. Many such experiences threatened the fabric of societies with a plethora of conflicts which continue to ravage many countries. Over the last decade, some of these wars have produced complex emergencies, which have led to various combinations of genocide, destruction of infrastructure, the forced displacement of populations and regional destabilization from Somalia to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Liberia, Sierra Leone and recently, the Ivory Coast. The period witnessed a gradual decline of interstate conflicts while intrastate conflict remains the scourge of development in the African region. Out of some 60 conflicts recorded in this period, only three were interstate. The other, more violent ones

were fought within national geographical boundaries.

With few exceptions, African countries do not face major external threats. Most of the security challenges they face are internal, and these are of two kinds: **threats to personal or human security as a condition of decent livelihood, and those having to do with the maintenance of public order, security and safety.** Unarguably, it is the primary responsibility of any state to ensure the security of people and their property, providing protection from threats to personal or human security. Human security includes not only protection against criminality but also the people's right to basic social services and to preventive as well as relief and rehabilitation measures with respect to disasters. State capacity to respond to these challenges, however, remains demonstrably weak in Africa. While this is due in part to lack of appropriate infrastructures, technologies or proactive planning, in some cases it is a result of the total indifference of political authorities.

The degradation of the environment, which creates health problems and affects people's ability for decent livelihood, is aggravated by the prevalence of poverty. The need to eke out a living in difficult circumstances often forces people to adopt survival strategies that may result in environmental degradation through tree-cutting, over-grazing, over-cropping, and water pollution. These and other problems of human security generally receive less attention from political authorities than matters of law and order, particularly those dealing with banditry and political unrest. This situation, which often pits law enforcement agencies such as the police against adversaries who are better armed, is symptomatic of the crisis of development in most African countries, where a large number of young people out of

school or without employment can easily be tempted into a life of adventure in armed and criminal bands. The neglect of human security needs more often than not results in identity-based and other forms of internal conflict, which destroy existing capacities for development.

Generally, conflicts due to economic grievances by themselves alone rarely flare up into violent confrontations. It is when such grievances are politicized, or reinforced by ethno-religious factors, that large-scale popular insurrections are possible. In some countries, the failure of the state to ensure regular payment of salaries and scholarships has often brought it into violent confrontations with public sector employees and students. While access to the state and the resources under its control is generally the bone of contention in violent conflicts in Africa, there are wider social processes at work, which determine the social and political significance of identities through which conflicts manifest. In themselves, identities do not cause conflict. They are simply an organizational arena for collective action for defending or promoting the values and interests of a group.

The growing number of identity-based conflicts in Africa today is undoubtedly a function of the conflicts of economic interests within the context of heavy political manipulations. The Nigerian Civil War, the Sudan conflict, the liberation struggles in southern Africa, the recent escalation of land disputes in Zimbabwe, the Hutu-Tutsi confrontation in Burundi and Rwanda, amongst several others, offer an example of countries where the conflict of economic interests took an ethnic coloration and a violent dimension. The same can be said of pre-Samuel Doe's Liberia, where the native Liberians had been thrown into a long-drawn battle with the American-Liberians in the struggle for

Zimbabwe

political power. Sadly enough, the economic root of the conflict has today found expressions in the wave of violence in the oil-producing zones, where resource control contention and the resultant killings, abductions, kidnapping and ethnic confrontations have become the order of the day. The Rwandan genocide that pitted the Tutsis and Hutus against one another is also rooted in economic and political manipulations. The same is true of Burundi, where the Hutus, who constitute the majority, rebelled against the domination of the Tutsis. The lesson from this is that there is no global model of democracy and democratization must recognize the socio-cultural specificities of each country. It is obvious that the model of democracy required in Africa would differ from one country to another, as rigid application of democratic principles would lead to monopoly of power by one group. It is for this reason that the option of rotational presidencies has come under rigorous debates in a number of African countries, particularly in Nigeria.

In response to the challenges of the post Cold War era for Africa and the concern of the likely fate of Africa in the wake of the ensuing reconfiguration of the global order, the Africa Leadership Forum initiated the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) in 1990. The CSSDCA recognizes the affinity between security, stability, development and cooperation, and posits that there can be no stability without security. Neither can there be security without stability, and development would be impossible without stability and security. It argues further that the security of every African country is inseparably linked to the security of a number of other African countries, given the cross-cutting nature of

ethno-cultural identities in many countries. CSSDCA therefore broadened the traditional and militaristic definition of security and argued for an understanding of the concept of security in which the individual and not the regime or the state is the centerpiece of security concerns.[4]

As many have rightly argued, the idea of the state's being the referent and provider of security has over the years impeded the capacity of many African countries to make appreciable progress. The subjugation of human security under regime security has meant that not only the power structure, but also access to and appropriation of socio-economic resources, have often been combined to serve the interest of and to perpetuate authoritarian regimes. Clearly, this can only culminate in highly variegated power elites, political stalemate, popular insurrections, mobilization of ethno-religious and sectional sentiments to react to perceived injustices in power relations and access to the socio-economic resources of the state. The incremental rate of conflicts have over the years required various attempts to redefine the traditional notions of security and development, and to understand the nexus between the two.

Governance structures and their implications for development and security

The root cause of violent conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa is competition for scarce resources in the context of economic underdevelopment and disruptive political manipulation. In many countries, the achievement of peace and security poses a major challenge for sustaining development. This indeed suggests a critical need to examine the structures of governance in Africa vis-à-vis their implications for the

development and security of the African people.

The essence of government the world over is to secure lives and property, as well as to create an atmosphere conducive to commerce. To achieve this, citizens surrender a measure of rights to their elected representatives. They also pay taxes, which the government is expected to expend in providing basic social services and economic infrastructure. The government is therefore saddled with the duty and responsibility of creating a stable polity in which private enterprise thrives.

By definition, governance is the system of values and institutions by which society manages its affairs, through interactions within and between the state, civil society and the private sector. It is the use of political, economic and administrative authority and resources to manage a nation's affairs.[9] Government must be accountable, open and transparent, if it would meet the aspirations of the people. While governance can take many forms, between tyranny and anarchy, democratic forms of governance are generally credited with *good governance.*

There are three major attributes every government must possess in order to develop. The **first** is an effective constitutional framework of checks and balances among the major organs of government, with an enforceable legislative oversight over executive actions and an independent judiciary to promote the rule of law. The **second** are public service and law-enforcement agencies that are well trained, adequately remunerated and highly motivated to serve the public. The **third and last** is an active and vigilant civil society, one that is capable of holding public officials accountable and of participating fully in the public policy process.

Also, there are three main levels of governance, which are interconnected,

interdependent and mutually reinforcing: the national, regional and international levels. In order to meet the challenges of sustainable development, every government must seek to understand the functioning of these layers of governance and define an appropriate framework of relationship with them.

It is therefore necessary for a country to pursue sustainable development objectives within a coherent and coordinated framework. African countries must note the need for policy coherence and ensure that their development strategies and frameworks are in harmony with sub-regional, regional and international development policies. Governance at the international level on the other hand must also be able to design a comprehensive framework that meets the development goals of both the developed and developing nations in a balanced and integrated way and which also ensures that its policies are consistent with the priorities of developing countries. Governance at the regional level must engage national governments and provide forums for the sharing of experiences and good practices, and for deliberations on regional development options and priorities. Regional and sub-regional governments must adopt collective measures for peace-building and conflict resolution. The world has witnessed a gradual shift from the concept of peacekeeping to peace enforcement, as witnessed in NATO's involvement in Kosovo and ECOMOG intervention in Liberia, and regional organizations are better designed to respond to the threats to peace and security.

Unfortunately for Africa, barely ten years after independence many countries experienced a sudden transformation. Whereas the immediate post-independence era saw the rise of new elites who had won political power

Zimbabwe

and had the difficult task of developing their economies to meet the rising expectations of the people, the constitutional rule handed over by colonial authorities soon degenerated into dictatorships of various kinds, and the emerging democracy began soon gave way to totalitarian regimes in military and civilian form. The militarization of state and society culminated in the reconfiguration of the political landscape, stifled socio-economic development and plunged many countries into violent conflicts. With the rise of authoritarian regimes, political opponents and opposition forces were weakened, imprisoned or completely intimidated. Political activities were restricted to political associations and parties recognized and patronized by the ruling elites. The major tendency was towards institutional collapse. The gulf between the rulers and the people, the haves and have-nots, could only deepen.

The composition of and peculiar history of most African states made many of them vulnerable not only to nepotism, sectionalism and ethno-religious conflicts. They were further exposed to the effects of the external shocks and upheavals of the global market, which also exacerbated internal tension. Although most countries had by and large gained independence by late 1960s, the economy of the post-colonial African state had been designed to further the interests of the colonial powers. African countries remained suppliers of raw materials and served as markets for the products of the former colonial powers.

The nation-building process in Africa in the colonial era was largely by coercion rather than cooperation. Disparate and rival political entities were brought together in many instances, while in other cases, large ethnic entities were scattered, divided and shared among the colonial powers. The artificial unity

forged by the colonial authorities is part of the fundamental causes of conflicts in Africa. It also explains the cross-border nature of civil wars in Somali, Rwanda, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Uganda and several others. The object of colonialism right from the start was economic exploitation. The divide and rule policy more often than not merely succeeded in planting all manner of time bombs which blew up many countries shortly after independence. First were the series of military coups d'etats that destroyed the fragile democracy cobbled together by the colonial powers, followed by the civil wars that continue to ravage many countries. This was further aggravated by the relative ease of access to arms and munitions partly as fallout from the Cold War.

Although a range of regional and sub-regional economic and political frameworks were designed and deployed by African political leaders ostensibly to foster unity, accelerate the decolonization process and stimulate economic development in the post independence years, they also lacked the capacity to halt rising woes. Africa's major political continent-wide framework had recorded demonstrable successes in the pursuit of the objectives of article 2(d) of its Charter. Those achievements paved the way for a recommitment to unity and solidarity, the defense of territorial integrity and independence of the various states, and the co-ordination and intensification of individual efforts to achieve a better life for African peoples.

The OAU posted varying degrees of success in pursuit of the objectives articulated in Article 3 of its Charter, in particular in the areas of diplomatic and political co-operation as well as co-operation in other spheres such as economic, transportation, communication, health, science, technology, defense and security. Yet the continent and its major

Zimbabwe

political framework could not deal decisively with the challenges of peace and security. Indeed, the premium on social and political stability was rising rapidly at a time when the changing international political framework had begun to marginalize the African continent and its concerns. There was also a growing awareness that what little progress the continent had achieved in economic development left much to be desired and that poor economic performance underlined the rising wave of domestic conflicts.

More often than not, the immediate concern of the helmsmen in Africa at that point in time seems to have been that of regime-perpetuation, and the personalization of power and state resources. People's consent, views and interests were no longer a major factor in governance. The majority of the leaders either became stooges of the major powers, or those who could, relied on their own military networks to suppress popular unrest and armed rebellions. Rulers unilaterally granted themselves extended terms of office whenever political challengers made legitimate bids to displace them. Political opposition forces were framed, imprisoned or exterminated.[5] The parliament was either replaced by Supreme Military Councils or other forms of military arrangements, or weakened by the overbearing executive and became its mere appendage.

Instead of freedom and material prosperity, the expected dividends of independence and democratic governance, the people of Africa found themselves in the fetters of insecurity and in an endless cycle of economic crises, with all its consequences in terms of social unrest, which in several instances degenerated into violent conflicts.

With the orchestration of arbitrariness and illegality in governance, citizens began to lose faith in political helmsmen, due to the latter's inability to solve basic socio-economic and political problems. Most of the helmsmen remained essentially authority figures, who showed a demonstrable lack of capacity to exercise the required leadership. In time, they lost their credibility and political mandate through tribalism, nepotism and corruption. This political development was accompanied by extensive state intervention in the economy. In several countries, government sought to seize the commanding heights of the economy. In other ridiculous instances, government took control of the production and distribution of goods and services. The political situation became one in which leaders gave undue favors to their kinsmen, political lackeys and political jobbers.

Under the authoritarian regimes, electoral bodies and their executives conducted elections in a manner that favored incumbents, while electoral procedures such as voters' registration, voting and counting were conducted in a way that raised doubts on the neutrality and credibility of these bodies. Illegalities were also extended to the media. Opposition media outfits were banned or prevented from publishing information that was adjudged to be detrimental to the interest of the ruling elite.

Some countries made it appear that they were adhering to democratic practices. For many countries, the transition to democracy was more of compulsion than voluntary. With the emergent world order and the emergence of the US as the professor of liberal democracy, democratization became a condition for access to international support and assistance. It therefore became imperative for developing countries to embrace or profess liberal democracy or lose the assistance and support of the donor community. Many African leaders tried to respond to the new challenge in a variety of ways.

Zimbabwe

Until his death during his 7th tenure in 1993, Felix Houphouet Boigny, who led his country into independence, dominated the economic and political life of his country. He arbitrarily extended his terms in office. Sporadic political unrests were usually without cohesion, as political patronage was tactically employed to defuse political unrest. He was able to guide the political and economic evolution of his country without any effective challenge to his authority. The Ivory Coast is still embroiled in the political upheaval that has shaken the very foundations of the country.

Eyadema's Togo is another case in point. From April 1967 when he seized power, he managed to manipulate every election to cling to power. He controlled the elections machinery. The National Assembly was also an appendage of his cabinet. He succeeded in satisfying the international community and donors who were mainly interested in seeing a semblance of democracy. No wonder he was immediately replaced by his son after his demise. Further examples are President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, who has ruled his country for twenty-five unbroken years and the seventy-two year old Mathieu Kerekou of the Republic of Benin, who has dominated his country's politics for more than three decades.

Beginning from the tail end of the last millennium, multi-party elections were conducted in many countries. However, the political environment still remains turbulent in some countries like Mauritania, the Sudan, Congo Kinshasa, Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Angola, and even in Nigeria, where political assassinations and thuggery linked to intra-party, ethno-religious and communal clashes remain part of the essence of reality. While political re-engineering has demonstrated that democratic elections are just the first step towards good governance, the critical

challenge is institutionalizing the norms and principles of democracy.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the political crisis and the widening gulf of poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa reflect a deep crisis of governance. The reason for the destruction of several political regimes is the "absence of qualitative and sustained response from those who are supposed to manage the transition process — the leaders on both the government and opposition sides," as Balogun argued.[6]

Transparency in public affairs and the accountability of rulers to the governed are integral parts of the universal principles of governance upon which democracy is based. Clearly, defective governance structures can only produce defective leaders. Leadership, particularly when examined within the context of the African region, offers an insight into the puzzling question of why democratization has failed to generate enough momentum in some countries to overtake authoritarian or military regimes and to dismantle or weaken the patron-client network holding the system together.

These structural defects in the various social formations can be examined at two levels: economic and political. At the economic level is the problem of incomplete transition from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist mode of production. At the political level are the fundamental structural imbalances in the society. The two defects tend to feed on and reinforce each other, thus producing a situation of permanent, now latent, then manifest, socio-economic and political crisis. It is also the combination of these that has engendered the sort of political leadership that most African countries have been unfortunately saddled with.[7]

At the political level, the colonialists created the Colonial State which, according to Walter Rodney, was a "one-armed bandit". Its philosophical basis was

Zimbabwe

praetorian and completely extractive. It functioned with minimal responsibility over the governed. The Colonial State was structured and designed to achieve this goal. It functioned as programed, and was only interested in brow-beating the colonized into acquiescing to its goals and objectives. In consequence, the Colonial State and its institutions were alienated from society. They were neither structured nor operated to function in the interest of the colonized. This legacy was inherited by the post-colonial state. These two disabilities have been further aggravated and compounded by a more fundamental defect vis-à-vis the lack of agreement on the basis of the corporate existence of several countries such as Nigeria.

Insecurity in terms of access to basic human needs like nutrition, education, shelter, etc, can only widen the gap between the rich and the poor. With time, the inequitable distribution of socio-economic resources and opportunities began to polarize many societies, and in due course politics began to take ethnic and socio-religious colorations, which later disintegrated into violent clashes, civil wars and genocides.

As already noted in the foregoing, regime security was the centerpiece of

military and authoritarian regimes. (See **Figure 1**.)

New policies aimed at improving the security and stability situation in Africa require first and foremost a deconstruction of the extant security architecture, or at least the conceptual basis of extant frameworks in the hope that the new approaches would be broadened enough to conceptually envisage the robust engagement of the three dimensions of security through a "reversed" concentric circle of security shown in **Figure 2**.

Under this new framework, human security occupies the inner concentric circle, followed by State security and regime security in the outer circle. The basis for this concept lies in the fact that a more secure people is a sure guaranty for the continued existence of the State and the reproduction of a conducive environment.

Fortunately for the people of Africa, developments within the continent in the past four years suggest the emergence of a broad consensus among African leaders on a number of issues regarding the future direction of development and transformation of the continent. African leaders have reorganized the main political framework through the creation of the African Union and the

Figure 1. The Regime-Centric

Figure 2. Human-Centric Security

Zimbabwe

adoption the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), a self-assessment instrument for ensuring the achievement of NEPAD objectives.

NEPAD is an initiative designed by Africans for the development of their continent, unlike previous initiatives that were more often than not external impositions. Although NEPAD has come under severe criticism from many quarters, the initiative marks a new trend in Africa's quest for sustainable development. No matter how one looks at it, the countries of the North will always be somewhat engaged with Africa. They are a major part of the equation. It is up to Africa to decide how it will utilize that engagement and turn it in its own favor.

The expansion of democracy provides a new model of relationship between Africa and the international community. As Africa nurtures its nascent democracies, the support of the international community will be required. The Huntington thesis that Africa is of no relevance in global politics is mistaken. Africa and the developed world can relate in a mutually beneficial manner. The African market is potentially large. Members of the International Community should assist Africa and channel resources to it based on the needs and interest of Africa within the framework designed and driven by Africans.

Development aid and conflicts in Africa

In a general sense, aid is a flow of financial resources from one entity to another, while development means *"the whole range of economic, social and cultural progress to which people aspire."*[8] Development aid can thus be termed an assistance received from donors for the purpose of improving the situation of the recipient. Development aid can help prevent or resolve conflict since it seeks to tackle

poverty through the provision and equitable allocation of socio-economic resources and to strengthen the governance capacity of the recipient. It is clear that armed conflicts and insecurity would remain a recurrent decimal in intra- and inter-state relations, unless poverty is tackled at the global level. Aid as a development strategy is therefore the best form of conflict prevention. German President Horst Kohler aptly captured this:

> *"Today, our planet is home to some six billion people. And by 2050, the world population may reach nine billion. What chance is there that these vast numbers of people can live together in peace — if more than half of them have to live on less than $2 a day?"*[9]

The entrenchment and institutionalization of the norms and principles of democracy attached to most current aid packages will broaden the horizon of individual freedom. With freedom also comes the latent potential of the individual and the citizenry who, in a bid to further expand their frontier of freedom, would devote their energies to productive ventures. When government provides equitable access to socio-economic resources and opportunities, recourse to war would be most unlikely, unless the fear of external aggression becomes so real, in which all, like in the Machiavellian Republic, would be ready to take arms not merely in defense of the nation but in defense of individual freedom and property.

In this context, the freedom to pursue individual objectives and undertake activities germane to individual interests would be a disincentive to conflicts. On the other hand, poverty or deteriorating economic conditions can easily lead to conflicts. The equitable allocation of and access to socio-economic

resources and opportunities are in themselves conflict prevention measures. Schumpeter captures it all, when he describes capitalism and democracy as forces for peace.[10]

Most conflicts around the world, particularly in Africa result from the inequitable distribution of and access to socio-economic resources. The Hutu–Tutsi confrontation in Rwanda, the Nigerian Civil War and the Liberian Civil War amongst others have their origins in socio-economic conflict of interests, within a context of defective power relation structures. While transition to democracy cannot banish war overnight, proper application of democratic norms and principles is a veritable peace-building strategy and a stimulant of sustainable development. Accountability, openness and transparency in governance will foster sustainable development, offer greater possibilities for peace-building, conflict prevention and resolution.

Although the effectiveness of aid as a development tool has been the subject of protracted debate, it is unquestionable that aid enhances socio-economic development efforts. There is broad consensus among scholars that aid is a major factor of growth. Development aid, particularly in the post Cold War era, comes with a number of stringent conditions aimed at entrenching the ideals of democracy in the recipient countries. Predominantly, aid is hinged on accountability, openness, participation and transparency in governance. Invariably, if aid increases economic growth, and these liberal democratic ideals are adhered to, incidences of socio-economic conflicts would be drastically reduced. Though competition, be it at the socio-economic, political or even ethno-religious levels will always be there, rarely would they degenerate into violent conflicts.

Mavrotas and McGillivray in their study of the effectiveness of aid in curbing poverty have rightly claimed that "poverty would be higher in the absence of aid".[11] It therefore follows that aid is mostly needed in a highly impoverished nation, particularly in societies bristling with bewildering diversities as most African nations are, where socio-economic and political power contestations can easily degenerate into armed conflicts. ODA and other forms of development assistance can therefore function as a powerful tool of conflict prevention. Aid as a conflict prevention tool not only increases public spending, it also ensures that the poor are the long-term beneficiaries of aid and that the principles and norms of democracy are strictly adhered to, particularly when there is popular participation in governance processes.

While some have argued that the increase in public expenditure due to aid can also be eroded by tax-cuts and a high level of public sector indebtedness[12], the impact of aid on economic growth is very vivid in Africa. Without aid, many African economies would have collapsed, particularly those that have had to face natural disasters such as drought and severe famine. More Africans would have been forced into a life of abject poverty and recourse to arms would be inevitable.

The effectiveness of aid can also be felt in countries in conflict situations or in post-conflict societies through peace negotiations, peace keeping mission, humanitarian assistance, and post-conflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. A lot of effort has been devoted by donor agencies to maximize the effectiveness of aid. Most aid is sector specific. Some may be supportive of the health or security sector, some target the education sector, while others may target

Zimbabwe

governance or specific aspects of governance.

Of course, as some have argued, aid can also be subject to diminishing returns. A number of studies have shown that aid can assist development up to a certain level, and that after that level the law of diminishing returns will set in. This happens when the aid exceeds the recipient economy's aid-absorption capacity — i. e., when development aid constitutes 15 – 45% of GDP.[13] This can only occur when aid is not properly channelled or when it is not a product of deep commitment or not backed by a long-term development strategy.

Prior to 2002, in spite of the positive impact of aid on development and the professed efforts to lift Africa from the dungeon of poverty, the level of ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa did not see any significant increase. ODA flow to Africa increased from the 1960s to the late 1980s, after which it trended downwards. It peaked in 1990 at US$17.3 billion but fell in the mid-90s. It fell further from $16.9 billion in 1994 to 11.6 billion in 1999. (See **Table 3**) Again it trended up, reaching $17.7 billion in 2002.

The decline in aid flow in the 1990s was in the wake of the end of the Cold War. The decline actually confirmed the fears expressed by some African leaders at the inception of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) in Paris in 1990, that the collapse of communism would have ominous consequences for Africa, in that the industrialized countries which "had channelled considerable resources of development assistance to Africa" might turn their backs on Africa and divert aid towards countries geographically contiguous to them.[14] Donors indeed relocated from Africa in favor of "less impoverished countries in other parts of the world."[15]

Since 2001, the pattern of flows has trended up. Gross ODA receipts from both bilateral and multilateral donors increased by USD 9.3 billion between 2001 and 2003, with Sub-Saharan Africa accounting for about two-thirds of the rise. Debt forgiveness rose by USD 4.3 billion in this period, emergency aid rose by USD 1.6 billion, with the largest increases going to Ethiopia, Sudan, Angola, DR Congo and Eritrea. The increase was also influenced by the war on terrorism, as net aid to Afghanistan rose from USD 0.4 billion to USD 1.5 billion, while aid to Iraq rose from USD 0.1 billion to USD 2.3 billion.[16] Gross bilateral ODA average to Africa was US$18. 611 for 2003 and 2004.

The period 1991-2002 when ODA trended downwards, which also marked the end of the Cold War, witnessed sporadic outbursts of conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, while the conflicts raging in other countries — the Sudan, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), Niger, Senegal/ Casamance, Uganda, etc. continued unabated. The causes and nature of conflicts in Africa are as complex as in other parts of the world. While the origins of conflicts in this period are not homogenous, certain characteristics are common to all of them, and these are institutional fragility, endemic corruption and heavy militarization. They all involve multiple groups struggling for political and socio-economic power.

Tom Lodge highlights a typology of conflicts in Africa in the 1990s, categorizing conflicts in the 1990s under seven groups:

- *ethnic competition for control of the state (Burundi and Rwanda);*
- *regional or secessionist rebellions (the Sudan, the Tuareg Uprising in Northern Niger, the Casamance*

Zimbabwe

Table 3. Total Net Disbursements of Total Official and Private Flows by Type, 1971-2001(%)

Type	Official and Private Flows	1971-80	1981-90	1991-2002
	All Developing Countries			
Bilateral	Official Development Assistance(ODA)	36.7	50.8	43.6
Multilateral	Other official Flows(OOF)	29.0	38.3	30.9
		7.7	12.5	12.7
		8.7	6.6	4.3
	Private Flows	50.7	38.2	47.7
	Grants from NGOs	3.9	4.4	4.8
	Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
	Sub-Sahara Africa			
Bilateral	Official Development Assistant (ODA)	59.5	77.8	88.3
		42.0	52.9	54.2
		17.5	24.9	34.1
Multilateral	Other Official Flows (OOF)	11.2	14.4	0.2
	Private Flows	29.3	7.9	11.5
	Grants from NGOs	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
	The Pacific			
Bilateral	Official Development Assistant (ODA)	89.0	78.1	93.5
		84.8	71.2	87.2
		4.2	6.9	6.3
Multilateral	Other Official Flows (OOF)	5.6	8.7	2.5
	Private Flows	5.4	13.3	4.0
	Grants from NGOs	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.
	Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: OECD (2004)

Secessionist Movement in Senegal;
- *continuation of liberation conflicts (Angola,South Africa)*
- *fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority (Algeria);*
- *warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse* (Liberia, Congo, Sierra Leone);
- border disputes; and
- *protracted conflict within*

politicized militaries (1998 mutiny of the Guinea-Bissau army, Congo-Brazzaville and Lesotho).

While the Cold War enhanced the military capacity of many African countries, unfortunately the end of the hostilities did not "lead to a substantial reduction in warfare in Africa" as Lodge has rightly pointed out.[17] In the struggle for hegemony,

Zimbabwe

the two superpowers used aid to either gain new proxies or to maintain old ones. With the cessation of hostilities however, the flow of ODA and other forms of aid declined tremendously. The consequence for many countries was manifold: from the general weakening of the economy to the clamour for political emancipation by ethnic groups. For some countries, the resources needed to subdue internal conflicts by force of arms were no longer coming; for others, due to lack of aid, the inequitable allocation of state resources culminated in socio-economic conflicts which in many instances were tainted by ethno-religious colorations and degenerated into full-blown conflicts.

The international community was however shocked out of its apathetic stance by the monster it had helped in creating, by the violent nature of African conflicts (Liberia, Sierra Leone, Congo — Kinshasha, Burundi, Somalia, Rwanda, etc.). While it can be argued that that the aid cuts only helped to fast-track the latent conflicts in many countries, the conflicts also exposed the fragility of the post-colonial African state and brought to the fore the interconnectedness of security, stability and development in Africa. They also reinforced the interconnectedness and interdependence of the global system, and this has refocused the attention of the developed countries on Africa. While this may seem a positive development, care must be taken that aid disbursement does not undermine the needs and interests of African countries. Aid should address the perceived or expressed needs of recipient countries and not the interest of donor countries. Aid is oftentimes based for the interests of donors instead of the needs of recipients. It is used by donor countries to further their own strategic interests, and countries in desperate need rarely get enough of it.

While the massive response of the international community to the Burundi and Rwandan pogrom was essentially humanitarian in nature, the longest conflict in Africa, the Sudan crisis that began in 1957, did not attract the attention of the international Community until oil was discovered in that country. Apart from this, a cursory look at the history of the international community's interventions in African conflicts would reveal a reactive approach. Interventions in African conflicts have been largely focused on peacekeeping.

Aid has rarely been used as a long-term development and conflict-prevention strategy. Poor countries with high levels of poverty and weak institutions that are not of strategic importance to donor countries are more often than not starved of aid. Interestingly, many low-income countries depend on aid to balance their budgets and provide basic services to their people. In the absence of aid, such countries are thrown into economic upheavals which more often than not result in conflicts, as their scarce resources become excessively strained. As a conflict-prevention strategy, it is imperative that aid to low-income countries be increased.

Current aid allocation patterns also show that countries with stronger institutions and those emerging from conflicts receive more aid than countries with weak and fragile institutions. Three African countries — Ghana, Congo Kinshasha and Egypt — are listed with the ten top recipients of ODA/OA in 2004. (See **Table 4.**) While DRC is still embroiled in conflict, Egypt and Ghana have stronger institutions than many African countries. A larger percentage of bilateral ODA to post-conflict countries in 2003 and 2004 was for emergency assistance: about 71% for Liberia and Sudan, 40% for Burundi and Ethiopia and 50% for Eritrea. It is also pathetic that aid to post-conflict recipients

Table 4. *Top ten recipients of gross ODA/OA in 2004 (US$ million).*

1	Iran	3 244
2	Democratic Republic Congo	3 183
3	China	2 341
4	India	1 717
5	Indonesia	1 544
6	Afghanistan	1 449
7	Egypt	1 308
8	Pakistan	1 247
9	Ghana	1 160
10	Vietnam	1 142

Source: OECD 2004

after initial increases in the first few years more often than not decreases very quickly afterwards.[18] This further reveals the lack of deep interest in Africa's progress by donor and development communities. Aid should be used to build the capacity of African states for sustainable development. It should be used to tackle the causes of conflict before they degenerate into violence, and not for conflict-resolution or post-conflict reconstruction alone.

US President Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive 25, which prohibits the US from intervening in conflicts that do not involve its national interests, provides a case in point. While the US has been involved in peace and security missions in Africa, it is true that it is not merely the love for democracy or the need to expand human freedom that guides US foreign policy. The real stakes for US foreign policy, according to Mel Leiman "are control over oil and minerals and the securing of military bases."[19]

The Reagan administration embraced Master Sergeant Doe when he toppled President Tolbert, the then Chairman of OAU, and took power in Liberia. The interest of the US in supporting Doe was to use Liberia as a line of defense during the Cold War. Liberia was to become the largest recipient of US aid, receiving $500 million between 1980 and 1985 alone. During this period, Liberia housed the relay facility of the Voice of America for Africa and the Middle East. The Omega Navigation Station, a naval intelligence gathering entity for the South Atlantic, was also located in the country. Further, Liberia also signed an agreement with the United States that allowed the US military access to Liberian sea and airport facilities.

Doe, however, used the American aid to enhance his political base and imposed himself on the people of Liberia. Even after rigging the election to return himself to power, the US did not wane in its support. The relevance of Liberia for the US, however, came to an end after the fall of Berlin Wall. This explains why US intervention was not forthcoming during Taylor's reign of terror and also why Clinton's administration could not find a justification for US intervention. Some suggested that the US had a moral responsibility to intervene in view of its support for Doe's regime and the destruction that followed.[20] An argument that tried to justify US intervention on the basis that Liberia was founded by freed American slaves in the 1800s was rebuffed by Carpenter who considered it unsound "for the US to intervene when there is no vital security interest at stake" and further that "the circumstances of the founding of a country more than 150 years ago has no relevance whatsoever to the question of whether the United States ought to take action in the 21st century".

It is only under peaceful and secure conditions that trade can thrive. While some have argued that Lome and Cotonou Agreements are not products of equal partnership, in that the capacity of African trade negotiators is abysmally low when

compared with the expertise of seasoned European trade negotiators, it is apparent that the notion of interdependence and collective security is taken seriously by the EU. The creation of the European Union African Peace Facility (EU-APF) by the EU is a welcome development. It demonstrates the genuine interest of EU in finding lasting solutions to the African crisis. Efforts to resolve the Sudan conflict received a major boost from the US$250 million Euro EU-APF, when 18 million Euro was provided in support of the African Union observer mission to support the implementation of the ceasefire agreement (June 2004).[21]

Sierra Leone has also been enjoying donors' attention since the re-election of President Tejan Kabba in 2002. In an attempt to stabilize the counry, the United Nations made tremendous investments in Sierra Leone, while other bilateral donors, notably the UK and the US amongst others, rallied to the country's support. The budget for the UN mission for July 1, 2004 - June 30, 2005 was US$301.9 million.[22] The foregoing further illustrates the inter-linkage between development aid, conflict and development. Aid not only injects more resources into recipient countries, it reduces poverty through investments in critical sectors of the economy and thereby reduces the risk of armed conflict. Declines in aid also translate into declines in public expenditure and the degeneration of clashes of economic interests into violent conflicts.

African needs and interests differ from US interests. The major development imperatives for Africa is the achievement of sufficiency in food production, health care delivery and the general welfare of her people, while the interest of the US is first of all to promote her interest and police the world with a view to ensuring that no perceived or real opposition becomes strong enough to jeopardize US interests and those of US multinationals scattered around the globe. Africa is therefore in dire need of initiatives designed mainly to promote and foster sustainable development. The US has overcome the problems associated with underdevelopment and can therefore look beyond its frontiers to protect her economic interests — and any potential threat to that interest is repulsed with the most severe military action.

Since aid is desirable for development, the question arises as to whether aid is provided and designed according to the developmental objectives of the recipient or the interest of the donor. This is the critical factor that influences the effectiveness of aid. The resource allocation and development expenditure should take into account the needs of the recipient country.   Since development in Africa is at an ebb, African leaders are confronted with the need to lift up millions of their people from the gulf of poverty and disease. It is therefore imperative that aid and national resource allocations are channelled first and foremost to tackle the main causes of poverty. If the purpose of aid is to foster development, any development aid that does not recognize African interests over and above any other should be discouraged. Donor countries should be sincere in their relations with African countries and should channel assistance to address the real problems confronting the recipient countries.

September 11 has redefined US interest in Africa. The war on terror has become a global war, to be mainstreamed in all American development policies. Most of American aid to African countries is security related and aimed at furthering the war on terror. While this may not be wrong for the US, African needs and interests must supersede the interests of donor countries.

Zimbabwe

Since development engenders peace and contentment among the masses, sustainable development will usher in peace and security. The threat of conflict whether internal or external will bend under the weight of development because a satisfied populace would be less likely to revolt. Aid recipients should peruse the conditions attached to any aid package and ensure that they are not inimical to their own interest. This will forestall a situation where the aid received becomes a curse instead of a blessing. The effective diversification of the resource and production base is of vital importance to rapid socio-economic transformation. Aid should be channelled to assist African countries in this regard.

While liberal democracy indeed represents the best governance system that can foster sustainable development and the expansion of human freedom, care must be taken not to universalize a particular model of democracy. The practice of democracy differs from society to society, and for democratic governance to produce the desired result, it must be anchored in the lived culture of the people. It is the norms and values of society that determine the model of democracy appropriate for a particular society. Therefore, donor and development agencies should not deal with Africa as a homogenous entity. Rather, proper review of the ethno-

cultural specificities of individual African countries should precede the formulation of donor policies. Liberal democratic norms and principles which often inform the conditions attached to most aid are not of universal applicability. A study of the socio-cultural and political landscape of potential recipients and a proper understanding of the power relations structure and functioning of African countries should guide donors' interventions.

On the whole, the interconnectedness of aid and development, and their impact on peace-building and conflict transformation cannot be overemphasized. While the effectiveness of aid is more profound in post-conflict societies, more aid should also be channelled to low income and conflict-prone countries. Post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts also require greater and sustained inflows of aid. Inadequate aid flows can lead to the resumption of armed hostilities. But aid should be welcomed only when it compliments rather than undermines the developmental efforts of African countries. Partnership, trust and transparency between African leaders and citizens and between African countries and developed countries will be critical in lifting the people of Africa from the quagmire of poverty and disease.

Notes

[1]   Jean-Louis Dufour, (Col.) "How Can We Make War on War?" *In From Partial Insecurity to Global Security* (Paris; UNESCO Publ. 1996)p.35

[2]   Schoeman, Maxi, "An Exploration of the Link between security and Development" in Solomon, Hussein and Shoeman, Maxi (ed.), *Security, Development and Gender in Africa*, Johannesburg (1999), p. 9.

[3]   Olonisakin, Funmi, "Security and Sustainable Development: An African Perspective" (http://

www.dcaf.ch/publications/e-publications/ SSR_UNOG_DCAF/Olonisakin.pdf

[4]   African Union, Solemn Declaration on the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa, in Aderinwale, Ayodele (ed.) (2002), *CSSDCA: African Agenda for Peace and Prosperity.* P.121 ff.

[5]   *Ayodele Aderinwale, Security and Sustainable Human Development in Africa,* Lead Presentation

for the Millennium Partnership for African Recovery Programme MAP, Consultative brainstorming session on MAP, Abuja, Nigeria May 2001

6   Balogun M.J. ' '*Enduring Clientelism*, *Governance Reform and Leadership Capacity: A Review of the Democratization Process in Nigeria* in Aderinwale, Ayodele (ed.) *Parliamentarians & the Sustenance of Political Liberalisation in Africa* (Washington: WBI 1996)

7   Ibid.,

8   Boutro Boutros-Ghali, "The Interaction Between Democracy and Development "UNESCO Publications, 2003.

9   Horst Koehler, "Economic Development and Security," (February 11, 2005) See www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/ showArticle3.cfm?Article_ID=10948

10 Schumpeter, Joseph. 1955. "The Sociology of Imperialism." Imperialism and Social Classes. Cleveland: World Publishing, p. 68.

11 Addison, T, Mavrotas, G and McGillivray, M, "Aid, Alternative Sources of Finance and the Millennium Development Goals". Paper presentation at the "Development Financing: Global Policy Agenda" session at the Development Studies Association Annual Conference, London, November 2004. P.1

12 McGillivray, M. and O. Morissey (2001a), New of Evidence of the Fiscal Effects of AID, CREDIT Research Paper, No 01/13, Centre for Research in

Economic Development and International Trade, University of Nottingham, Nottingham.

13 Clemens, M and S. Radelet (2003), The Millennium Challenge Account: How Much is Too Much, How Long is Long Enough? Centre for Global Development Working Paper No. 23, Centre for Global Development, Washington.

14 Machungo, Mario Aderinwale (2002) P. 1.

15 See Reference 12 above. P.6

16 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/52/34352584.pdf

17 Lodge, Tom (1999), Towards an Understanding of Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa, published in Monograph No 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa? by Institute of Security Study of South Africa.

18 Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler (2004). "Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-Conflict *Societies.*" *European Economic Review 48:5 (October). Pp. 1125-1145.*

19 *Leiman, Mel,* "Violence in Liberia: the role of imperialism", *Freedom Socialist, Volume 24, No 3.*

20 *Ezekiel Pajibo <epajibo@africaonline.co.zw> is an independent researcher/consultant based in Zimbabwe and an analyst for Foreign Policy in Focus (online at www.fpif.org*

21 Mehler, Andreas, et al (ed) Africa Year Book 2004. (Leiden, 2005), P. 22.

22 Ibid., p. 166